2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Sylvain Duchesne 738d59596a Serve the backend under a base path: one URL per environment, the backend under /api
The test deployment keeps one base URL per environment, as the sibling
ActivityPods apps do, so a pull-request preview lives on a single host: the
app at the root, the backend under /api on the same host, its /.well-known
routes at the origin root, the proxy passing paths through unchanged.

SemApps already works that way — it mounts every route it adds under the base
URL's path and keeps /.well-known at the root — but Festipod's own pieces were
written for a backend at the root of its own origin: its routes (/app,
/as/actor/app, /catalog) were mounted at fixed paths, the public-surface
allow-list matched fixed paths (so under /api every request would have been
refused), and the Solid-OIDC client_id joined the raw request path to the base
URL, which would have repeated the base path (/api/api/...).

base-path.js derives the base path from SEMAPPS_HOME_URL; the routes are
mounted under it; the allow-list matches paths relative to it, the two
/.well-known endpoints against the full path; the client_id is the requested
URI rebuilt from the base URL as written, equal byte for byte to the actor
URI and to what the front end derives. At the root every gate decision is
identical to before (compared over ~8M method/path cases). The rights matrix
probes /.well-known at the backend's origin root.

Verified: bun test (424 pass); the full gate at the root; and the built images
behind a local proxy routing /api and /.well-known unstripped with the Host
header kept — login flow, rights matrix 98/98, revocation.
2026-10-19 16:44:09 +02:00
Sylvain Duchesne 88f23b7023 Harden the backend's trust surface: an allow-listed public surface, decisions taken on data re-read from the pod
The backend served its settings dataset (including the app actor's private key) to anonymous callers, through the SPARQL endpoint and through the semapps LDP catch-all route, since WebACL is off. An allow-list mounted on every route now exposes only what the app and the pod need (/app, /as/actor/app and its Client ID Document, /catalog, the public key, access needs, the JSON-LD context, nodeinfo, the app inbox and the webhook endpoint); everything else answers 404.

Every watcher-fed service (public read, catalog, attendees, contacts, registration) now decides on the activity and object re-read from the pod as the app, checks they belong to the outbox owner and that the stored object has the expected type, and never acts on the notification body. Decisions for one object are serialized and taken on a read made when acting, with a 30 s bound and an abort check before every write. The anonymous read follows the event's visibility both ways, attendees collection included; Festipod records the grants it makes and revokes only those, leaving any other public share untouched; an unreadable ACL changes nothing. A participant's attendance follows their latest act by the pod's timestamp, not the order notifications arrive. Known limits (no conditional write on the pod, a write in flight at the timeout) are documented in the code.
2026-10-13 16:30:52 +02:00