Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Sylvain Duchesne 5540d361c7 Implement direct sign-up to an event with registration derived from meeting point memberships 2026-11-06 23:16:29 +01:00
Sylvain Duchesne 9e2df2478b Deliver Join and Leave to the app's inbox instead of an unaddressed outbox post
A participation activity is now addressed to the Festipod app actor alone and
handled on reception in the app's inbox, the way the ActivityPods developer
advised: use the ActivityPub protocol rather than a side channel. Any
compatible sender may deliver; the inbox accepts only the activity's own
signer, and the backend still requires the activity to lie in that actor's pod
and acts on the stored copy.

The meeting point is read again in its creator's pod before anything is
written: read through the participant's pod, a foreign server's proxy chose
the attendee list and the notification's name.

Confidentiality is unchanged: the Join stays readable by its author and the
app only. Recorded in decision_2026-11-03_participation-delivered-to-the-app,
a named exception to festipod-only-reference-app-patterns.
2026-11-03 18:31:24 +01:00
Sylvain Duchesne 908f7ea973 Keep sign-ups unlinkable on ActivityPods, and land the pending coherence-pass work
Participation privacy (decision_2026-10-29_participation-privacy-mechanism):
a sign-up is a private Join naming the meeting point, addressed to nobody,
handled by the backend on emission. Attendee lists hold member URNs hashed
from (WebID, event, a secret kept in the participant's profile), so counts
stay public and only contacts recognise anyone; the creator has no read
right and is notified anonymously. Each person's participations collection,
created by the backend at the first sign-up, is readable by their /contacts
WAC group only, never world-readable. The member URN is sticky per
(meeting point, participant) and every collection write is verified by
reading back, so a refused write leaves the act unrecorded and retryable.
The EventRef mechanism and its browser-side provisioning are gone.

The backend now runs with WebACL on, as the reference apps do, on its own
secure datasets festipod / settings-festipod instead of the pod provider's
settings dataset; pod-notifications needs it. The compose header and the
deployment leaf say how to reset a stack whose datasets predate this.

The rights matrix covers the new mechanism live (148 hard lines), including
a forged contact Accept between throwaway accounts: the stranger enters the
contacts list (platform defect, reported upstream) but is refused the profile
and the participations. Tests may attack as long as they never break the dev
environment (rule_tests-never-break-the-dev-environment).

Also lands the coherence-pass work that was still uncommitted: contacts as
the Pod's social graph and invite links, image upload to the Pod, the
meeting-point form, profile completion gate, and the doctrine for them.
Superseded briefs and decisions are deleted rather than annotated.
2026-10-30 17:06:38 +01:00
Sylvain Duchesne 88f23b7023 Harden the backend's trust surface: an allow-listed public surface, decisions taken on data re-read from the pod
The backend served its settings dataset (including the app actor's private key) to anonymous callers, through the SPARQL endpoint and through the semapps LDP catch-all route, since WebACL is off. An allow-list mounted on every route now exposes only what the app and the pod need (/app, /as/actor/app and its Client ID Document, /catalog, the public key, access needs, the JSON-LD context, nodeinfo, the app inbox and the webhook endpoint); everything else answers 404.

Every watcher-fed service (public read, catalog, attendees, contacts, registration) now decides on the activity and object re-read from the pod as the app, checks they belong to the outbox owner and that the stored object has the expected type, and never acts on the notification body. Decisions for one object are serialized and taken on a read made when acting, with a 30 s bound and an abort check before every write. The anonymous read follows the event's visibility both ways, attendees collection included; Festipod records the grants it makes and revokes only those, leaving any other public share untouched; an unreadable ACL changes nothing. A participant's attendance follows their latest act by the pod's timestamp, not the order notifications arrive. Known limits (no conditional write on the pod, a write in flight at the timeout) are documented in the code.
2026-10-13 16:30:52 +02:00
Sylvain Duchesne 8dfc574346 Close the adversarial review round: auth hardening, data fidelity against the platform context, backend grants and docker coherence 2026-10-10 09:54:53 +02:00
Sylvain Duchesne e17398d86d T04.f: backend Festipod ActivityPods + dockerisation
- Ajoute la configuration et les services backend (app, actors, registration,
  attendees, contacts, catalog, core auth/nodeinfo/proxy/notification).
- Corrige le démarrage : désactive resourcesWithContainerPath pour éviter le
  conflit entre l'URI de l'acteur applicatif (/as/actor/app) et la route /app.
- Corrige l'URL du dépôt de shapes : https://shapes.activitypods.org/.
- Ajoute backend/Dockerfile et docker-compose.yml racine (frontend + backend).
- Met à jour .env.example racine avec les variables SEMAPPS_* et VITE_BACKEND_*.
- Gates verts : bunx tsc --noEmit (0 erreur) et bun test (50 pass).
2026-10-09 13:51:02 +02:00