Participation privacy (decision_2026-10-29_participation-privacy-mechanism):
a sign-up is a private Join naming the meeting point, addressed to nobody,
handled by the backend on emission. Attendee lists hold member URNs hashed
from (WebID, event, a secret kept in the participant's profile), so counts
stay public and only contacts recognise anyone; the creator has no read
right and is notified anonymously. Each person's participations collection,
created by the backend at the first sign-up, is readable by their /contacts
WAC group only, never world-readable. The member URN is sticky per
(meeting point, participant) and every collection write is verified by
reading back, so a refused write leaves the act unrecorded and retryable.
The EventRef mechanism and its browser-side provisioning are gone.
The backend now runs with WebACL on, as the reference apps do, on its own
secure datasets festipod / settings-festipod instead of the pod provider's
settings dataset; pod-notifications needs it. The compose header and the
deployment leaf say how to reset a stack whose datasets predate this.
The rights matrix covers the new mechanism live (148 hard lines), including
a forged contact Accept between throwaway accounts: the stranger enters the
contacts list (platform defect, reported upstream) but is refused the profile
and the participations. Tests may attack as long as they never break the dev
environment (rule_tests-never-break-the-dev-environment).
Also lands the coherence-pass work that was still uncommitted: contacts as
the Pod's social graph and invite links, image upload to the Pod, the
meeting-point form, profile completion gate, and the doctrine for them.
Superseded briefs and decisions are deleted rather than annotated.
The test deployment keeps one base URL per environment, as the sibling
ActivityPods apps do, so a pull-request preview lives on a single host: the
app at the root, the backend under /api on the same host, its /.well-known
routes at the origin root, the proxy passing paths through unchanged.
SemApps already works that way — it mounts every route it adds under the base
URL's path and keeps /.well-known at the root — but Festipod's own pieces were
written for a backend at the root of its own origin: its routes (/app,
/as/actor/app, /catalog) were mounted at fixed paths, the public-surface
allow-list matched fixed paths (so under /api every request would have been
refused), and the Solid-OIDC client_id joined the raw request path to the base
URL, which would have repeated the base path (/api/api/...).
base-path.js derives the base path from SEMAPPS_HOME_URL; the routes are
mounted under it; the allow-list matches paths relative to it, the two
/.well-known endpoints against the full path; the client_id is the requested
URI rebuilt from the base URL as written, equal byte for byte to the actor
URI and to what the front end derives. At the root every gate decision is
identical to before (compared over ~8M method/path cases). The rights matrix
probes /.well-known at the backend's origin root.
Verified: bun test (424 pass); the full gate at the root; and the built images
behind a local proxy routing /api and /.well-known unstripped with the Host
header kept — login flow, rights matrix 98/98, revocation.
- Ajoute la configuration et les services backend (app, actors, registration,
attendees, contacts, catalog, core auth/nodeinfo/proxy/notification).
- Corrige le démarrage : désactive resourcesWithContainerPath pour éviter le
conflit entre l'URI de l'acteur applicatif (/as/actor/app) et la route /app.
- Corrige l'URL du dépôt de shapes : https://shapes.activitypods.org/.
- Ajoute backend/Dockerfile et docker-compose.yml racine (frontend + backend).
- Met à jour .env.example racine avec les variables SEMAPPS_* et VITE_BACKEND_*.
- Gates verts : bunx tsc --noEmit (0 erreur) et bun test (50 pass).
Sylvain Duchesne