Participation privacy (decision_2026-10-29_participation-privacy-mechanism):
a sign-up is a private Join naming the meeting point, addressed to nobody,
handled by the backend on emission. Attendee lists hold member URNs hashed
from (WebID, event, a secret kept in the participant's profile), so counts
stay public and only contacts recognise anyone; the creator has no read
right and is notified anonymously. Each person's participations collection,
created by the backend at the first sign-up, is readable by their /contacts
WAC group only, never world-readable. The member URN is sticky per
(meeting point, participant) and every collection write is verified by
reading back, so a refused write leaves the act unrecorded and retryable.
The EventRef mechanism and its browser-side provisioning are gone.
The backend now runs with WebACL on, as the reference apps do, on its own
secure datasets festipod / settings-festipod instead of the pod provider's
settings dataset; pod-notifications needs it. The compose header and the
deployment leaf say how to reset a stack whose datasets predate this.
The rights matrix covers the new mechanism live (148 hard lines), including
a forged contact Accept between throwaway accounts: the stranger enters the
contacts list (platform defect, reported upstream) but is refused the profile
and the participations. Tests may attack as long as they never break the dev
environment (rule_tests-never-break-the-dev-environment).
Also lands the coherence-pass work that was still uncommitted: contacts as
the Pod's social graph and invite links, image upload to the Pod, the
meeting-point form, profile completion gate, and the doctrine for them.
Superseded briefs and decisions are deleted rather than annotated.
The data layer is now reached through one pulled, version-pinned engagement
(`.project/concepts/data-layer/contract_polyfill-surface.md`, @1ecf511e9d).
That copy is the only reference: the provider's sources are never opened, and
what the contract does not answer is a gap raised with it, never worked around
here.
Surface
- `@ng-eventually/sdk` -> `@ng-eventually/polyfill`, one entry point.
- `configure` loses `getSession`, `normalizeId`, `currentUser`; the session
belongs to the package and its own `init` captures it.
- Placement is named by scope alone -- a session is one user, so the app no
longer passes an identity it had no way to obtain. This removes a constant
that made every user collide on one owner's document.
- `init(...)` then `await ensureIdentity()`, in that order, as one sequence:
React runs child effects first, so the two calls sat in the wrong order and
the contract now makes that throw.
- `sessionId` relayed as `string | number`, `materialize` -> `read`.
A rejection means "unknown", never "absent"
Four places treated a caught error as an empty result. The worst wrote a
duplicate participation: an unknown count read as zero defeated the idempotence
guard of `joinEvent`. Also fixed: a per-document count, a silently dropped
notification shown optimistically anyway, and a failed listing that left the
owned-event set empty and disabled the materializer for the whole session.
Shared identity is not a Festipod notion
A browser context is one user. The per-scenario identity plant is deleted at
its source and its five sites; what stays is the deployment's wallet file,
which the contract requires an application to serve.
Documentation
The doctrine no longer describes how the data layer works underneath: five
leaves whose subject was internals are gone, a dozen more are re-founded on the
contract's own words, and two frozen arbitrations about a deleted screen were
removed rather than left to mislead a future session.
Test harness
It can sign in at last: cucumber runs under node, which does not load `.env`,
so the harness never received the wallet material and every scenario silently
fell back to an empty local mode. A failed sign-in is now loud on both sides.
The suite also releases what it opens and exits on its own -- runs were still
resident hours after reporting, holding a browser and two servers.
Known red: `@data` cannot be measured. The served wallet accumulates and
nothing resets it; moving the browser profile aside does not, since the data
lives in the wallet file, not the profile.
- data-layer/brief_2026-07-20_attendance-set-model : réaligner les inscriptions
sur la vision initiale — objet participation auto-possédé (la vérité) + Set
curé de références cap-less sur l'événement + cap scellé aux seules
connexions ⇒ compteur = `Set.size`, présence anonyme par défaut, personne ne
désinscrit autrui. Inclut la revue adverse (trilemme anonyme/dédup/inviolable)
et les verdicts du spike P0 vérifiés dans `nextgraph-rs` :
fetch d'existence sans clé = OUI, détection de suppression sans clé = NON
(⇒ la désinscription passe par un nudge), confidentialité = OUI.
Statut : direction cible, PAS un pivot immédiat.
- data-layer/rule_file-nextgraph-bugs : tout dysfonctionnement NextGraph
identifié donne lieu à une fiche dans `../../nextgraph/orm-tests/INBOX/`.
- to-discuss : alignement ReadCap/WriteCap, terminologie identité NextGraph.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014GbGgNEHRejVKoREvFuDFg
Sylvain Duchesne