Bug: à la reconnexion, resolveAccount lisait le shim depuis le store-root
(did🆖${privateStoreId}), NON abonnable → pas de barrière first-State → un "0 rows"
à froid est ambigu → le retry (resolveAccountReliably/provisionRetry) échoue → nouveau
compte provisionné → FORK → données du compte invisibles.
Cause NextGraph (vérifiée nextgraph-rs): "trouvable-sans-lookup" (store-root) et
"abonnable" (did:ng:o:<RepoID aléatoire>) sont DISJOINTS — pas de doc à la fois
devinable et attendable → une résolution shim purement barrière est impossible.
Fix (indirection pointeur → doc-shim abonnable):
- Les AccountRecord migrent dans un doc-shim doc_create'd (did:ng:o:..., a une barrière).
- Un pointeur écrit-une-fois dans le store-root (<shim:root> <shim:shimDoc> <docShim>)
le nomme. resolveShimDoc lit le pointeur → ensureRepoOpen(docShim) [barrière] → lecture
de compte AUTORITATIVE (cold 0 = absent pour de vrai). Retry de compte SUPPRIMÉ.
- Micro-garde résiduel (pointerGuard, ex-provisionRetry) sur le SEUL triple pointeur
écrit-une-fois; ne peut jamais forker un compte; fork de pointeur réconcilié au
doc-shim canonique (lexicographiquement-min), sans perte.
- Migration: migrateLegacyRecords copie (pas déplace) les comptes de l'ancien store-root
vers le doc-shim avant toute conclusion "absent"; idempotent; wallet neuf → no-op.
Tests: unit 128/128, e2e réel 42/42 (CONTRACT 2 = non-fork du compte à la reconnexion),
red-before/green-after prouvé. Docs: nextgraph-current-state (antagonisme + indirection),
simulation, migration-guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause racine du bug de reconnexion (probe contrôlé répété) : le shim d'un compte
accumule des `docPublic`/`docProtected` EN DOUBLE (forks passés), et
resolveAccount/indexDocOf les choisissaient de façon NON-DÉTERMINISTE → l'écrivain
et le lecteur (page fraîche) ancraient sur des docs d'index DIFFÉRENTS → lecture 0.
Fix :
- `canonicalDoc()`/`recordFromRows()` : parmi plusieurs valeurs d'un scope, choisir
le NURI lexicographiquement le plus petit (les NURIs sont content-addressed →
ordre total stable). Écrivain et lecteur résolvent TOUJOURS le même doc, même sur
un shim corrompu par des doublons.
- `resolveAccountReliably` RESTAURÉ (retry borné avant provision sur read shim 0 à
froid) : j'avais retiré l'anti-fork à tort (`38b1521`) — le gap EST exhibé (fork
non-déterministe au cold-read), et la barrière `user_connect` n'est PAS accessible
côté JS → un retry borné est la compensation légitime (pas la barrière-store
cassée de `45dbd9a`). Budget injecté `provisionRetry` ; défaut attempts:1 (fakes
synchrones), app/e2e attempts:8.
anti-fork.test.ts réécrit : docPublic dupliqué → même canonique ; retry sur lag →
réutilise ; neuf → provision 1×.
gate : tsc 0 ; bun test 122 ; test:e2e 42/42 (CONTRACT 2 non-fork vert).
Portée : corrige la couche docPublic de la reconnexion. Une couche PROTECTED
distincte (watchShape protected ne converge pas à froid) reste — diagnostic en cours.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Preuve e2e (wallet frais, broker RÉEL rapide : 1er State 1-2 ms) : le private
store est synchronisé au login, la lecture du shim réussit à froid — le « fork sur
lag » que anti-fork compensait n'est PAS exhibé. Par le principe du polyfill
(compenser un gap RÉEL, jamais du poids mort), et par la règle no-polling :
- la version retry = polling (bannie) ;
- la version barrière `ensureRepoOpen(privateStore)` = CASSÉE (un store n'émet pas
de `State`, la barrière timeout systématiquement → CONTRAT 2 e2e échouait) ;
- le gap = non exhibé.
→ `ensureAccount` fait un `resolveAccount(id)` SIMPLE (une lecture, provision si 0).
`resolveAccountReliably`, `_forceOpenedSyncState` retirés ; `provisionRetry` gardé
optionnel @deprecated (ignoré) pour ne pas casser les 8 tests qui le passent.
`ensureRepoOpen`/`getSyncState` inchangés (chemin de lecture open-repo).
gate : tsc 0 ; bun test 116 ; test:e2e 39 passed, CONTRAT 2 VERT (« same account,
no second provisioning »). Le ~10s du re-resolve public est du scaling anchorless,
pas de la lenteur broker (broker mesuré à 1-2 ms).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause racine mesurée (broker réel, access-log) : à la première resolveAccount
d'une session, le record de compte tout juste persisté (ou d'une session
antérieure) peut lire 0 lignes à cause du LAG DE SYNC broker. ensureAccount
interprétait ce 0 comme « compte inexistant » et RE-PROVISIONNAIT un second jeu
de docs de scope (docPublic/docProtected forkés) → les lectures d'une session
tombaient sur un jeu, celles d'une autre (ou après drop de cache) sur l'autre
jeu vide → données « perdues » à la reconnexion.
Fix : `resolveAccountReliably` (store-registry.ts) — retry borné (ouverture du
repo d'ancre shim + backoff plafonné, défaut 8 tentatives / ≲8.5s) AVANT que
ensureAccount ne décide qu'un compte est neuf. Provisionne seulement si, après
le budget, la lecture rend toujours 0 (compte réellement neuf). Budget injecté
via StoreRegistryDeps.provisionRetry (polyfill.ts), ON en prod ; tests unitaires
à provisionRetry synchrone (attempts:1, fake sans lag). Idempotence de session
préservée par accountCache (hit court-circuite, déterministe).
Portée : corrige le déterminisme de provisioning. NE suffit PAS à réparer la
reconnexion (le read public à 0 same-session subsiste, cause distincte encore à
mesurer de façon déterministe — le lag broker rend les mesures non-reproductibles).
Complémentaire du commit open-repo précédent, pas redondant.
gate : tsc --noEmit propre ; bun test 91 pass ; auth @data (vide/distinctes) verts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Observability probe for the shared-wallet isolation footgun: on one physical
wallet several virtual identities coexist, and a read must never surface a doc
scoped to another identity. When it does (B reading A's doc), the leak is
invisible in the data — it looks like a normal read. This makes it VISIBLE.
Every real read/write is logged, prefixed by the ACTIVE virtual identity
(getCurrentUser → the account the op is scoped under, NOT the constant shared
physical wallet id). Reads append the row count — a strong leak signal:
[urn:festipod:user:bob] READ did:ng:o:docA (readDoc) → 3 rows
Instrumented at the LOW common point in docs.ts: every read routes through
sparqlQuery, every write through sparqlUpdate, container creation through
docCreate. Callers pass a semantic label (readDoc|readUnion|listMyEntityDocs|
writeEntity|deposit|…) that is a lib-internal probe param, NOT forwarded to the
real `ng` (preserves docs.test.ts exact-forwarding assertions).
OFF by default → one boolean read on the hot path, zero output. On via
configure({ debugAccessLog: true }) or env NG_EVENTUALLY_ACCESS_LOG=1 (no code
change). Polyfill-era; removed at the real multi-store migration.
tsc --noEmit: 0 errors. bun test: 91 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Align the polyfill's surface and docs with the verified NextGraph reality and
remove application-level concepts:
- Identity is an ID, not a username: AccountRecord.id, shim predicate shim:id,
normalizeId; accounts core becomes IdentityStore (set/clear/get) — the faux
login/logout framing is gone (identity is set at wallet-import time).
- Relationship/connection is an application concept, not a platform primitive
(NextGraph has no bilateral-connection primitive: grantee is unpersisted
scaffolding, cap-send is unimplemented). Remove connections.ts; caps exposes
only a directed grantRead(doc, granteeId) + a read-only protectedDocsOf(owner).
Delete the now-dead isolation.ts social-visibility axis.
- Inbox docs: NextGraph has no separate curator — the recipient's own verifier
unseals and applies each queued sealed message inline (process_inbox);
inbox_post_link is a proposed/future API. Stop attributing the emulated
curator to the platform.
- Read isolation reframed around the outcome: no cap -> empty union read;
targeted read of an unheld repo -> RepoNotFound; cap introspection
(canRead/governsRead) is emulation-only with no NextGraph API behind it.
- read-model.md corrected: the listing path is per-doc ANCHORED default-graph
queries, never the anchorless GRAPH ?g union (that is O(wallet)); the probe
section no longer claims the opposite.
- README recap table restructured (target | current NextGraph status | current
emulation); INDEX_ACCOUNT documented as reservedAccount("index") in the
sentinel namespace; de-domained generic-layer comments; softened tone.
Consumer application (Festipod) rewired separately to own the relationship
concept and feed the lib an id. Lib gates: bun test 83 pass / 0 fail, tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ReadCap filter now enforces on per-entity documents (consumers create one doc
per entity, so each has a declared policy — private→owner, protected→owner+
connections, public→all). Isolation is genuinely active, not dormant.
- connections.ts (new): a BILATERAL connection registry — a link grants protected
read only when BOTH sides have asserted it (each assertion bound to its author).
A unilateral/self-declared connection grants nothing (closes the confused-deputy
hole). declareConnections is authenticated to the current identity.
- inbox.post: `from` is bound to the current identity — a spoofed `from` throws.
- discovery.submitToIndex: PUBLIC-ONLY — a governed non-public doc is refused
(no protected/private leak into the world-readable index).
- docs/simulation.md: documents this as application-level emulated isolation on a
shared wallet (not crypto); at NextGraph maturity → real caps, consumer unchanged.
89 tests pass (+10 covering: active protected isolation via bilateral connect,
unilateral grants nothing, from-spoof rejected, non-public submit refused). tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Isolation was dormant (no current identity ever set). Now: setCurrentUser
records who is reading; declareConnections(neighborsOf) grants each protected
document's read cap to owner + connections. Reads discriminate through the
ReadCap filter: private→owner, protected→owner+connections, public→all. Generic
(the consumer injects identity + connections). Write-guard coverage limits
documented honestly in docs/simulation.md (real write paths bypass the JS proxy;
full enforcement awaits native caps). isolation-active.test.ts proves the
protected+connections path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port the shared-wallet shim mechanics from the Festipod app into the
generic @ng-eventually/client library — zero app-specific knowledge, the
consumer injects the domain (entity->scope mapping, connections, storage).
New namespaces exposed from src/index.ts:
- docs docCreate/sparqlUpdate/sparqlQuery via the REAL injected `ng`
(getConfig().ng), never the public makeNg proxy — the JS-over-
iframe double proxy breaks doc_create postMessage marshaling
(DataCloneError). Validated hard constraint.
- storeRegistry generic (account,scope)->NURI resolver, createEntityDoc/
listEntityDocs + per-scope index, sharedWalletShim in the
private_store, cache. Consumer wiring injected via
configureStoreRegistry({ getSession, normalizeUser }).
- isolation pure applyIsolation (public=all / protected=owner+connections
/ private=owner); accessors + connection graph injected.
- accounts AccountStore (localStorage-backed faux login, storage injected)
+ normalizeUsername. React wrapper intentionally NOT ported.
polyfill.ts gains configureStoreRegistry/getStoreRegistryDeps + resetConfig.
36/36 bun test, tsc --noEmit rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Model the read filter on NextGraph's real ReadCap mechanism instead of an
invented per-item grant. Verified in nextgraph-rs: there is no Document type
(document = repo); a store is a container repo referencing other repos by RDF
overlay; holding a store's cap does NOT grant the repos it contains (each repo
needs its own cap; no read-cap inheritance). So the access unit is the
DOCUMENT = an item's `@graph`, never the item.
- caps.ts: CapRegistry (read/write caps per document NURI + public docs;
open/grantRead/grantWrite/makePublic/canRead/canWrite/governsRead/
hasReadPolicy). Replaces access.ts (Grant).
- read-filter.ts: filter keeps an item iff its `@graph` document is readable
(held cap or public); items with no `@graph` or in an ungoverned document are
kept. No injected grantOf — the filter reads `@graph` and consults the
registry (automatic, domain-agnostic).
- polyfill.ts: getCaps()/resetCaps() replace setGrantOf/getGrantOf; useShape
filters only when caps.hasReadPolicy() (else passthrough, no regression).
- tests: caps.test.ts (6) + read-filter.test.ts (4), incl. no-inheritance
between documents. 10 pass; tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
makeReadFilteredView wraps a DeepSignalSet in a Proxy whose iteration/size/forEach
yield only items the current user may read (canRead on the item's emulated grant), while
add/delete and the underlying reactivity pass through. filterReadable is the pure core.
useShape applies it only when a grantOf resolver is configured (else passthrough, so
ungranted apps are unaffected). grantOf/setGrantOf added to the polyfill surface. Mirrors
the broker delivering only authorized docs; removed at migration. 4 unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lifecycle.ts forwards init (@ng-org/web) and initNg (@ng-org/orm) to the injected
SDK; index re-exports the SDK types (ShapeType, BaseType, Schema, DeepSignalSet, NG) so
consumers import everything from @ng-eventually/client. Type re-exports are erased at
build → no runtime @ng-org import added (no duplicate SDK copy). @ng-org added as
devDependencies (typecheck only) + peerDependencies. EventuallyConfig accepts init/initNg.
Typecheck + 4 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generic polyfill layer that makes a single NextGraph broker behave like the
not-yet-shipped multi-user NextGraph (emulated capabilities + inbox). Zero app domain.
@ng-eventually/client exposes an SDK-identical surface (ng, useShape, inbox); the
polyfill bootstrap (configure + capability helpers) is isolated under /polyfill, so
the main entry stays a drop-in for @ng-org/web|orm. The real SDK is injected at
configure() (no hard import → build-alias safe + testable).
Scaffold: NextGraph wiring stubbed with TODO; capability helpers implemented and
unit-tested (4 tests, typecheck clean). The global-index curator is deferred — in
NextGraph apps/services are mono-user with no global data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sylvain Duchesne