Inbox deposits and the per-(account,scope) index append were written into an
explicit GRAPH <plainNuri> named graph, which the real broker stores separately
from the repo's default graph (repo_graph_name with overlay suffix) — so an
anchored default-graph read (read-model.readDoc) never saw them and deposits
did not round-trip. Drop the GRAPH wrapper: the anchor scopes the write to the
repo's default graph, matching the read. Mocks updated accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
loadShim() read EVERY account record in the shim (SELECT over the whole anchor
graph). On a shim that accumulates accounts (the shared wallet grows), that is
O(accounts) and hangs the hot path (~90s at ensureAccount → loadShim). Same
principle as per-doc reads: never scan a shared structure.
Add resolveAccount(username): a BOUNDED SELECT anchored on the single subject
accountSubject(username) → O(1), independent of account count. Cache in a
per-account Map (cleared by resetRegistryCache). Hot paths now use it:
ensureAccount (existence check), indexInboxNuri/@index (discovery), resolveInbox
Anchor, resolveWriteGraph, createEntityDoc, listMyEntityDocs. loadShim kept only
for genuine all-accounts needs (allAccounts, the listEntityDocs fan-out fallback).
The 90s ensureAccount/loadShim hang is gone. 93 tests pass; tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ReadCap filter now enforces on per-entity documents (consumers create one doc
per entity, so each has a declared policy — private→owner, protected→owner+
connections, public→all). Isolation is genuinely active, not dormant.
- connections.ts (new): a BILATERAL connection registry — a link grants protected
read only when BOTH sides have asserted it (each assertion bound to its author).
A unilateral/self-declared connection grants nothing (closes the confused-deputy
hole). declareConnections is authenticated to the current identity.
- inbox.post: `from` is bound to the current identity — a spoofed `from` throws.
- discovery.submitToIndex: PUBLIC-ONLY — a governed non-public doc is refused
(no protected/private leak into the world-readable index).
- docs/simulation.md: documents this as application-level emulated isolation on a
shared wallet (not crypto); at NextGraph maturity → real caps, consumer unchanged.
89 tests pass (+10 covering: active protected isolation via bilateral connect,
unilateral grants nothing, from-spoof rejected, non-public submit refused). tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The special discovery-index account was keyed as "@index", which the consumer's
normalizeUsername collapses to "index" — colliding with a real user named
"index" (who could then hijack/tamper the global index document). Introduce a
reserved-account namespace (a sentinel key unreachable by any typed username) so
the index account can never collide with user input. Test proves a user named
"index"/"@index" resolves to a DIFFERENT document than the reserved index
account. 80 tests pass; tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a generic discovery-index surface: submitToIndex(ref) deposits a reference
into the index document's inbox; readIndex() returns the materialized entries. A
reserved special account (@index) owns the index document; deposits flow through
the emulated inbox and are materialized by the emulated curator (the dedup/
moderation point). This replaces cross-account fan-out as the discovery path and
is more faithful to the target (a single owned index fed via its inbox). Generic
(the consumer supplies the reference to index). 79 tests pass; tsc rc=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sylvain Duchesne