/**
 * SPARQL string-building safety helpers — shared by every module that builds
 * SPARQL by interpolation (inbox, store-registry).
 *
 * These exist because of SPARQL injection. When an untrusted value (an identity
 * id, a payload) is spliced verbatim into a query, a `"` closes a literal and a
 * `>` closes an IRI, letting the value inject arbitrary triples (or corrupt the
 * shim graph, the trust root mapping accounts → document NURIs). Every value that
 * reaches a query passes through one of these helpers first.
 *
 * Two positions, two strategies:
 *  - Literal position (`"..."`): {@link escapeLiteral}. Escape rather than reject,
 *    because literals legitimately carry arbitrary text (JSON payloads, display
 *    names). Escaping is lossless and reversible.
 *  - IRI position (`<...>`): two cases.
 *      · Trusted-shaped NURIs coming back from `ng` (`did:ng:...`): validate with
 *        {@link assertNuri} — they should never contain IRI-breaking chars; if one
 *        does, something upstream is wrong, so it throws rather than silently
 *        building a broken/injected query.
 *      · Untrusted values embedded into an IRI (an identity id used to mint an
 *        account-subject IRI): {@link escapeIri} percent-encodes every IRI-hostile
 *        character. Encode rather than reject so any id (spaces, unicode,
 *        punctuation) stays usable, while `<`, `>`, `"`, whitespace and control
 *        chars can never break out of the IRI.
 */

/**
 * Escape a value for embedding inside a SPARQL string literal (`"..."`).
 * Escapes backslash, double-quote and the C0 whitespace controls that would
 * otherwise terminate or corrupt the literal. Lossless / reversible.
 */
export function escapeLiteral(value: string): string {
  return value
    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
    .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
    .replace(/\n/g, "\\n")
    .replace(/\r/g, "\\r")
    .replace(/\t/g, "\\t");
}

/**
 * Delimiter characters that must never appear raw inside a SPARQL/Turtle IRI
 * ref (`<...>`): the space plus `< > " { } | ^ backtick \`. Whitespace beyond
 * the space and all C0/C1 control characters are handled by the code-point
 * check in {@link isIriForbidden}. Any of these would let a value break out of
 * the `<...>` and inject arbitrary syntax.
 */
const IRI_FORBIDDEN_DELIMS = /[<>"{}|^`\\ ]/;

/** True if `ch` (a single code point) may not appear raw inside an IRI ref. */
function isIriForbidden(ch: string): boolean {
  const code = ch.codePointAt(0)!;
  return IRI_FORBIDDEN_DELIMS.test(ch) || code < 0x20 || code === 0x7f;
}

/**
 * Percent-encode every IRI-hostile character in `value` so it is safe to embed
 * inside a SPARQL IRI ref (`<PREFIX:${escapeIri(value)}>`). Use this for
 * untrusted values (e.g. an identity id minted into an account-subject IRI):
 * encoding keeps every id usable while making breakout impossible.
 *
 * NOTE: this encodes only the delimiter/whitespace/control set, so ordinary
 * printable characters (including `:` `/` `.` `-` `_` and unicode letters) pass
 * through unchanged and the resulting IRI stays human-readable.
 */
export function escapeIri(value: string): string {
  let out = "";
  for (const ch of value) {
    if (isIriForbidden(ch)) {
      // Percent-encode each UTF-8 byte of the offending character. Also encode
      // the chars encodeURIComponent leaves alone but which are IRI-hostile.
      out += encodeURIComponent(ch).replace(
        /[!'()*]/g,
        (c) => "%" + c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase(),
      );
    } else {
      out += ch;
    }
  }
  return out;
}

/**
 * Assert that `nuri` is safe to embed verbatim inside a SPARQL IRI ref. NURIs
 * that come back from `ng` are trusted-SHAPED (`did:ng:...` or `urn:...`) and
 * should never carry IRI-breaking characters; if one does, we throw rather than
 * emit a query that could be malformed or injected. Returns the value unchanged
 * so it can be used inline: `<${assertNuri(doc)}>`.
 *
 * Generic in its argument so the caller's type flows THROUGH: passing a `Nuri`
 * gives back a `Nuri`, not a widened `string`. This function checks characters,
 * not the `did:ng:` shape (it legitimately accepts `urn:…` IRIs too), so it must
 * not be the thing that mints a `Nuri` — that is {@link isNuri}'s job.
 */
export function assertNuri<T extends string>(nuri: T): T {
  if (typeof nuri !== "string" || nuri.length === 0) {
    throw new Error(`[sparql] invalid NURI (empty): ${JSON.stringify(nuri)}`);
  }
  for (const ch of nuri) {
    if (isIriForbidden(ch)) {
      throw new Error(
        `[sparql] NURI contains IRI-forbidden characters, refusing to embed: ${JSON.stringify(nuri)}`,
      );
    }
  }
  return nuri;
}