/**
 * Cross-user access — the scenario that proves the model end to end.
 *
 * Alice owns a PROTECTED document and a PUBLIC one, and the public one carries a
 * REFERENCE to the protected one. Then:
 *
 *   - **Bob** has the public document's link. He reads it, sees the reference, and
 *     cannot read what it points at. Naming is not reading, and publication is
 *     **not recursive**: a public object may point at private content without
 *     disclosing it.
 *   - **Charlie** has the public document's link AND was given the protected
 *     document's cap. Same reference, same path — he reads through it.
 *   - **Bob, dynamically**: Alice delivers the cap to Bob's inbox. Processing the
 *     inbox files it, which fires the held-caps signal, which re-runs the read — the
 *     protected document appears with nothing else happening.
 *
 * The difference between Bob and Charlie is ONLY each of them holds. There is
 * no authorization list anywhere, and nobody was named to the registry.
 */
import { getCaps } from "../src/shared-wallet/bootstrap";
import { test, expect, mock, afterAll } from "bun:test";
import {
  createEntityDoc,
  resetRegistryCache,
  resolveWriteGraph,
  userInbox,
} from "../src/shared-wallet/account-registry";
import { documentInboxAddress, openDocumentInbox } from "../src/emulated-verifier/branch-registers";
import type { RegistrySession } from "../src/shared-wallet/account-registry";
import { configure } from "../src/index";
import { configureStoreRegistry, setCurrentUser } from "../src/shared-wallet/bootstrap";
import { connectedUser } from "../src/emulated-verifier/connect";
import { resetCaps, resetConfig, resetStoreRegistry } from "../src/shared-wallet/bootstrap";
import { share } from "../src/surface/inbox";
import { post, postToDocument, read as readInbox } from "../src/surface/inbox";
import { readUnion } from "../src/surface/read-model";
import { sparqlUpdate } from "../src/surface/docs";
import type { Nuri } from "../src/model/types";

/**
 * Do I hold this document's cap? Possession, asked of the internal registry — the
 * polyfill door stopped publishing this (see `polyfill.ts`), because as an app-facing
 * question it reads like "may I read this?" and a public store's document answers
 * `false` until something has asked for its cap.
 */
function hasCap(nuri: Nuri): boolean {
  return getCaps().capFor(nuri) !== undefined;
}

afterAll(() => {
  resetConfig();
  resetStoreRegistry();
  resetCaps();
  setCurrentUser(null);
});

const SESSION: RegistrySession = { sessionId: "sid-x", privateStoreId: "PRIV-X" };
const SHIM = "urn:ng-eventually:shim";
const INBOX = "urn:ng-eventually:inbox";
/** The predicate Alice uses to point from her public doc at her protected one. */
const REFERS_TO = "urn:e2e:refersTo";
const SECRET = "urn:e2e:secret";

interface Quad { g: string; s: string; p: string; o: string }

function unescapeLiteral(s: string): string {
  let out = "";
  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
    if (s[i] === "\\" && i + 1 < s.length) {
      const next = s[++i];
      out += next === "n" ? "\n" : next === "r" ? "\r" : next === "t" ? "\t" : next!;
    } else out += s[i];
  }
  return out;
}

/** A stateful fake `ng`: the shim SPARQL, the inbox SPARQL, and the anchored
 *  per-doc `?s ?p ?o` read the read-model uses. */
function makeFakeNg() {
  const quads: Quad[] = [];
  let docCounter = 0;

  const doc_create = mock(async () => `did:ng:o:doc${++docCounter}`);

  const sparql_update = mock(async (...a: unknown[]) => {
    const query = a[1] as string;
    const anchor = a[2] as string | undefined;
    if (!anchor) return undefined;
    // `DELETE WHERE { <s> <p> ?var }` — the form the lib uses to REPLACE a value
    // (see docs/decisions/sparql-delete-for-orm-objects.md). Without this arm the
    // fake would treat the delete as an insert and the replacement would silently
    // become an accumulation — the exact bug a replacement exists to prevent.
    const del = query.match(/^\s*DELETE\s+WHERE\s*\{\s*<([^>]+)>\s+<([^>]+)>\s+\?/);
    if (del) {
      const [s0, p0] = [del[1]!, del[2]!];
      for (let i = quads.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
        const q = quads[i]!;
        if (q.g === anchor && q.s === s0 && q.p === p0) quads.splice(i, 1);
      }
      return undefined;
    }
    // `INSERT DATA { GRAPH <g> { … } }` — the shape the store-ROOT pointer write uses.
    // Without this arm the first `<…>` in the body is the GRAPH NAME, so the pointer was
    // stored with the graph as its subject and its predicate as its object. The pointer
    // SELECT then found nothing, every cold `resolveShimDoc` forked a NEW shim, and the
    // suite never noticed because the module cache carried the previous answer. Added
    // 2026-08-10; the other fakes had it already.
    const gm = query.match(/GRAPH\s+<([^>]+)>\s*\{([\s\S]*)\}/);
    const body = gm
      ? gm[2]!
      : query.replace(/^\s*INSERT DATA\s*\{/, "").replace(/\}\s*$/, "");
    const sm = body.match(/<([^>]+)>/);
    if (!sm) return undefined;
    const s = sm[1]!;
    const pairRe = /(?:a|<([^>]+)>)\s+(?:"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"|<([^>]+)>)/g;
    let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
    const after = body.slice(body.indexOf(sm[0]) + sm[0].length);
    while ((m = pairRe.exec(after)) !== null) {
      const p = m[1] ?? (query.includes(`${INBOX}:Deposit`) ? `${INBOX}:Deposit` : `${SHIM}:Account`);
      const o = m[2] !== undefined ? unescapeLiteral(m[2]) : (m[3] ?? "");
      quads.push({ g: anchor, s, p, o });
    }
    return undefined;
  });

  const sparql_query = mock(async (...a: unknown[]) => {
    const query = a[1] as string;
    const anchor = a[3] as string | undefined;
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:shimDoc>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:shimDoc`).map((q) => ({ shimDoc: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:id>`)) {
      const subjM = query.match(/<([^>]+)>\s+a\s+<urn:ng-eventually:shim:Account>/);
      const only = subjM ? subjM[1]! : null;
      const bySubject = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>();
      for (const q of quads) {
        if (q.g !== anchor) continue;
        if (only !== null && q.s !== only) continue;
        const rec = bySubject.get(q.s) ?? {};
        if (q.p === `${SHIM}:id`) rec.id = q.o;
        if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docPublic`) rec.docPublic = q.o;
        if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docProtected`) rec.docProtected = q.o;
        if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docPrivate`) rec.docPrivate = q.o;
        bySubject.set(q.s, rec);
      }
      return {
        results: {
          bindings: [...bySubject.values()].filter((r) => r.id).map((r) => ({
            id: { value: r.id! },
            docPublic: { value: r.docPublic ?? "" },
            docProtected: { value: r.docProtected ?? "" },
            docPrivate: { value: r.docPrivate ?? "" },
          })),
        },
      };
    }
    if (query.includes(`<${INBOX}:payload>`)) {
      const bySubject = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>();
      for (const q of quads) {
        if (q.g !== anchor) continue;
        const rec = bySubject.get(q.s) ?? {};
        if (q.p === `${INBOX}:payload`) rec.payload = q.o;
        if (q.p === `${INBOX}:ts`) rec.ts = q.o;
        if (q.p === `${INBOX}:from`) rec.from = q.o;
        bySubject.set(q.s, rec);
      }
      return {
        results: {
          bindings: [...bySubject.values()]
            .filter((r) => r.payload !== undefined && r.ts !== undefined)
            .map((r) => {
              const row: Record<string, { value: string }> = { payload: { value: r.payload! }, ts: { value: r.ts! } };
              if (r.from !== undefined) row.from = { value: r.from };
              return row;
            }),
        },
      };
    }
    // User-branch `link` SELECT (the emulated AddLink records).
    // User-branch `inboxCap` SELECT (the emulated AddInboxCap records).
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:inboxCap>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:inboxCap`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Header-branch `inboxAddress` SELECT (where to deposit for this document).
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:inboxAddress>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:inboxAddress`).map((q) => ({ a: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Store-branch `readCap` SELECT (the emulated AddRepo records).
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:readCap>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:readCap`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:link>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:link`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Shim `isInbox` SELECT — the emulated "the broker knows this is an inbox". Absent at
    // first, so `isKnownInbox` answered from its in-memory set alone: the durable half was
    // never exercised, which is the very fault this pass was fixing elsewhere.
    if (query.includes(`${SHIM}:isInbox`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads
        .filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:isInbox`)
        .map((q) => ({ i: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Shim `docInbox:<scope>` SELECT — WHICH inbox a virtual user owns. Absent until
    // 2026-08-10, so `userInbox` never found a persisted address and answered from the
    // module cache alone: two actors in one JS realm agreed, two SESSIONS would not have.
    // The suite's "a third party resolves another user's inbox" was proving the cache.
    if (query.includes(`${SHIM}:docInbox`)) {
      const pm = query.match(/<(urn:ng-eventually:shim:docInbox:[a-z]+)>/);
      const pred = pm ? pm[1]! : "";
      const sm = query.match(/<([^>]+)>\s+<urn:ng-eventually:shim:docInbox/);
      const subj = sm ? sm[1]! : null;
      return { results: { bindings: quads
        .filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === pred && (subj === null || q.s === subj))
        .map((q) => ({ d: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Header-branch `exposedReadCap` SELECT — what a PUBLIC store serves to anyone.
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:exposedReadCap>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:exposedReadCap`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:contains>`)) {
      return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:contains`).map((q) => ({ e: { value: q.o } })) } };
    }
    // Anchored per-doc read (readUnion `SELECT ?s ?p ?o`) — the document's content.
    return {
      results: {
        bindings: quads
          .filter((q) => q.g === anchor)
          .map((q) => ({ s: { value: q.s }, p: { value: q.p }, o: { value: q.o } })),
      },
    };
  });

  return { doc_create, sparql_update, sparql_query, _quads: quads };
}

function inject() {
  const ng = makeFakeNg();
  configure({ ng: ng as any, useShape: (() => {}) as any });
  configureStoreRegistry({ getSession: async () => SESSION, normalizeId: (id) => id.trim().toLowerCase() });
  resetRegistryCache();
  resetCaps();
  setCurrentUser(null);
  return ng;
}

/** Write one triple into `doc`, as the consumer's write path would. */
async function write(doc: Nuri, p: string, o: string): Promise<void> {
  await sparqlUpdate(SESSION.sessionId, `INSERT DATA { <${doc}> <${p}> "${o}" }`, doc, "test");
}

/** The values `p` carries in the documents `docs`, as the current holder reads them. */
async function readValues(docs: Nuri[], p: string): Promise<string[]> {
  const subjects = await readUnion(docs);
  return subjects.flatMap((s) => s.props[p] ?? []);
}

/**
 * Alice's world: a protected document holding a secret, and a public document that
 * REFERS to it by bare NURI.
 *
 * What crosses to the other actors is **the bare reference of the public document and
 * nothing else** — no cap, no link with a key in it. That is the whole discipline of
 * this file: an application circulates references, and if a test had to hand a key
 * across an identity boundary through a JS variable, the feature it claims to prove
 * would have no path in any real application.
 */
async function aliceSetsUpHerDocuments() {
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
  await write(protDoc, SECRET, "the-protected-content");

  const pubDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  // The reference is the BARE NURI of the protected document: it names it, and
  // grants nothing. This is the whole point of the scenario.
  await write(pubDoc, REFERS_TO, protDoc);

  return { protDoc, pubDoc };
}

/** Follow the reference found in the public document — what a reader actually does. */
function referenceFoundIn(values: string[]): Nuri {
  const ref = values[0];
  expect(ref).toBeDefined();
  return ref as Nuri;
}

test("Bob: reads the public document, sees the reference, and cannot read through it", async () => {
  inject();
  const { protDoc, pubDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  // Bob holds the BARE reference and nothing else. The document sits in a public
  // store, so the store serves him its cap — he never received a key from anyone.

  // He reads the public document and finds the reference.
  const refs = await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO);
  const ref = referenceFoundIn(refs);
  expect(ref).toBe(protDoc); // he can NAME Alice's protected document

  // …and that is all it gets him: no cap, no read. Publication is NOT recursive.
  expect(hasCap(ref)).toBe(false);
  expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual([]);
});

test("Charlie: same public document, same reference — and he reads through it", async () => {
  inject();
  const { protDoc, pubDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
  const CHARLIE_INBOX = await userInbox("charlie", "protected");

  // Alice decides Charlie may read that ONE document, and delivers its cap to his
  // inbox. She names no principal to the registry; she addresses an inbox.
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await share(protDoc, "charlie");

  setCurrentUser("charlie");
  await readInbox(CHARLIE_INBOX); // processing the inbox files the cap

  const ref = referenceFoundIn(await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO));
  expect(ref).toBe(protDoc);
  expect(hasCap(ref)).toBe(true);
  expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
});

test("the ONLY difference between Bob and Charlie is each of them holds", async () => {
  inject();
  const { protDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
  const CHARLIE_INBOX = await userInbox("charlie", "protected");

  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await share(protDoc, "charlie");

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  const bobSees = await readValues([protDoc], SECRET);

  setCurrentUser("charlie");
  await readInbox(CHARLIE_INBOX);
  const charlieSees = await readValues([protDoc], SECRET);

  expect(bobSees).toEqual([]);
  expect(charlieSees).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
});

// The dynamic version: Bob is refused, then the cap lands in his inbox and the read
// that was empty becomes full — with nothing re-declared and nobody re-authorized.
test("dynamic: a cap delivered to Bob's inbox makes the refused document readable, and signals it", async () => {
  inject();
  const { protDoc, pubDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
  const BOB_INBOX = await userInbox("bob", "protected");

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  const ref = referenceFoundIn(await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO));

  // Before: named, unreadable.
  expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual([]);

  // A reader that re-reads whenever what it holds changes — this is exactly what
  // `watchShape` wires internally, played here on an ad-hoc read.
  let reread = 0;
  let latest: string[] = [];
  const unsub = getCaps().onChange(() => {
    reread += 1;
    void readValues([ref], SECRET).then((v) => (latest = v));
  });

  // Alice delivers the cap. Bob's client processes his inbox — the only thing that
  // happens; no "receive" call exists.
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await share(protDoc, "bob");
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await readInbox(BOB_INBOX);

  // Filing the cap fired the signal…
  expect(reread).toBeGreaterThan(0);
  await Promise.resolve();
  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));

  // …and the read that was empty now yields the content.
  expect(hasCap(ref)).toBe(true);
  expect(latest).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
  expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
  unsub();
});

// The property this whole batch exists for, stated on its own: WHERE a document sits
// decides whether a bare reference is enough. Upstream a public store's repos are
// served on the outer overlay and their ReadCap is downloaded from it
// (`PublicRepoLinkV0`, `engine/net/src/types.rs:5098`) — so the same value transmitted
// (a bare reference) yields a different outcome depending on the store, and never
// because a key travelled.
test("a bare reference is enough for a PUBLIC document, and not for a protected one", async () => {
  inject();
  const { protDoc, pubDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  // Bob has been given nothing but the two NURIs.
  expect((await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO)).length).toBe(1);
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual([]);

  // And what he obtained for the public one is a READ grant, not a write right: a
  // public store serves its read cap, no store hands out the write cap.
  await expect(write(pubDoc, SECRET, "bob-was-here")).rejects.toThrow(/public store/i);
});

// THE POINT OF THE LINK: a cap survives because it was APPLIED, not because the
// inbox is re-read. Upstream, processing an inbox message files it — `AddLink
// { read_cap }` on the User branch of the private store — and the queue is consumed.
// Re-reading a queue to recover state is using it as a database.
test("a Link is APPLIED durably: the cap survives with the inbox emptied", async () => {
  const ng = inject();
  const { protDoc } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
  const bobInbox = await userInbox("bob", "protected");

  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await share(protDoc, "bob");

  // Bob connects: the library restores + drains, with nothing asked of the app.
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await connectedUser();
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);

  // Now EMPTY the inbox — as a consumed queue would be — and drop every in-memory
  // cap, then re-arm the emulation so the boundary is actually in force again.
  for (let k = ng._quads.length - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
    if (ng._quads[k]!.g === bobInbox) ng._quads.splice(k, 1);
  }
  resetCaps();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await createEntityDoc("alice", "private"); // re-arms: a cap exists again
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  // Checked SYNCHRONOUSLY, before yielding: `setCurrentUser` fires the connection work
  // itself, and that work is precisely what restores the cap. An awaited check here
  // would be asserting who won a race, not what the library does.
  expect(hasCap(protDoc)).toBe(false); // bob holds nothing yet

  // Connecting restores it — from the User branch, since the inbox has nothing left.
  await connectedUser();
  expect(hasCap(protDoc)).toBe(true);
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
});

test("connecting a user that does not exist provisions nothing", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("nobody");
  await connectedUser();
  // No account, no stores, no caps — connecting must not create a user as a side
  // effect, or the emulation would arm itself in the background.
  expect(getCaps().isEnforcing()).toBe(false);
});

// REGRESSION (second adversarial pass). `inbox.post` is a published door that skips both
// guards by design — the deposit is the one write that legitimately crosses. It accepted
// ANY NURI, so it wrote into a document its caller could not even read. Upstream the
// confusion cannot arise: a deposit carries an inbox key, not a document reference.
test("a deposit is addressed to an inbox, never to a document", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
  await write(protDoc, SECRET, "alice's own");

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await expect(post(protDoc, { payload: { x: 1 }, ts: 1 })).rejects.toThrow(/not an inbox/i);

  setCurrentUser("alice");
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["alice's own"]); // untouched
});

// REGRESSION (second adversarial pass). The write guard reads ownership from the store
// index — and the holder's own store document was marked "created by me", so it was
// writable through the PUBLISHED `docs.sparqlUpdate`. One insert into it and you were
// the owner of anything you cared to name.
test("a holder cannot write into their own store index and forge ownership", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
  await write(protDoc, SECRET, "alice's own");

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await createEntityDoc("bob", "protected"); // bob has his own stores
  const bobStore = await resolveWriteGraph("bob", "protected");
  await expect(
    sparqlUpdate(SESSION.sessionId, `INSERT DATA { <${SHIM}:index> <${SHIM}:contains> "${protDoc}" }`, bobStore, "forge"),
  ).rejects.toThrow(/WRITE cap/i);
  // …and he is still refused the write itself — here by rule 1 (he cannot even reach
  // alice's protected document), which fires before the ownership guard. Both say no.
  await expect(write(protDoc, SECRET, "bob was here")).rejects.toThrow(/refused/i);
});

// WRITING IS OWNERSHIP — the two regressions that replaced the old write guard.
//
// It used to ask "was this cap served to me by a public store?", which was wrong in both
// directions at once. Both are pinned here, because one predicate pushed two ways is
// exactly how a fix trades one bug for a worse one.

// Direction 1 — TOO STRICT. The owner opening her own public note from its reference,
// before her store has been listed (a deep link, a fresh session), got the "served by a
// public store" mark on her own document and was refused a write to it.
test("the owner writes to her own public note, even after opening it from its reference", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const pubDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  await write(pubDoc, SECRET, "v1");

  // She arrives at it the way a deep link would: by reference, with nothing held.
  resetCaps();
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await createEntityDoc("bob", "private"); // re-arms the emulation
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await readValues([pubDoc], SECRET); // this is what files the served cap

  await write(pubDoc, SECRET, "v2"); // must not throw
  expect((await readValues([pubDoc], SECRET)).includes("v2")).toBe(true);
});

// Direction 2 — TOO LAX. A cap received in an inbox let its recipient WRITE into the
// owner's document. Upstream impossible: writing is repo membership, and a Link is
// "external repos only". An application could have shipped collaborative editing on it.
test("a cap received in an inbox reads, and does NOT write", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
  await write(protDoc, SECRET, "alice's own");
  const BOB_INBOX = await userInbox("bob", "protected");
  await share(protDoc, "bob");

  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await readInbox(BOB_INBOX);
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["alice's own"]); // he reads it
  await expect(write(protDoc, SECRET, "bob was here")).rejects.toThrow(/WRITE cap/i);

  setCurrentUser("alice");
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["alice's own"]); // untouched
});

// PER-DOCUMENT INBOXES. Upstream a repo carries `inbox: Option<PrivKey>` and its
// owner records the private half with `AddInboxCap` on the User branch — the same
// branch as `AddLink`. So "which inboxes may I read" has one answer, and connecting
// drains them all: the user's own, and one per document it opened an inbox on.
test("a document has its own inbox: anyone deposits, only the owner reads", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  const aliceInbox = await openDocumentInbox(doc);
  expect(aliceInbox).not.toBe(await userInbox("alice", "protected"));

  // Bob RESOLVES the address himself, from the BARE reference — the only thing he is
  // handed, and the only thing an application circulates. The document is in a public
  // store, so the store serves him its read cap; the address is not passed to him,
  // because if it had to be there would be no way for an app to get it.
  //
  // The registry cache is dropped first: Bob is another session, and an address he can
  // only find because Alice's session warmed a module map is an address no second browser
  // page would find.
  resetRegistryCache();
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  const bobTarget = await documentInboxAddress(doc);
  expect(bobTarget).toBe(aliceInbox); // …and it is the SAME inbox alice reads
  await post(bobTarget!, { payload: { joining: true }, ts: 1 });

  // …and he cannot read it back: depositing grants nothing.
  await expect(readInbox(bobTarget!)).rejects.toThrow(/does not belong to the connected wallet/i);

  // Alice reads her document's inbox, because she opened it.
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const deposits = await readInbox(aliceInbox);
  expect(deposits.map((d) => d.payload)).toEqual([{ joining: true }]);
});

test("opening an inbox on someone else's document is refused, not silently forked", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  const aliceInbox = await openDocumentInbox(doc);

  // Bob can READ the document (it is in a public store) — and reading is not ownership.
  resetRegistryCache(); // another session, not a warmed cache
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  await expect(openDocumentInbox(doc)).rejects.toThrow(/already has an inbox|you may only open an inbox/i);
  // The address he resolves is still alice's, so his deposits reach her.
  expect(await documentInboxAddress(doc)).toBe(aliceInbox);
});

test("a fresh document has NO inbox — one belongs to one document, and only its owner opens it", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");

  // Not "the owner's inbox by default": upstream an inbox belongs to exactly ONE repo
  // (the verifier routes by `inboxes: PubKey → RepoId`), so pointing several documents
  // at one inbox is a relation the model cannot express.
  resetRegistryCache(); // another session, not a warmed cache
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  expect(await documentInboxAddress(doc)).toBeUndefined();
  // …and depositing THROWS rather than vanishing — a lost deposit is the bug this
  // whole path exists to close.
  await expect(postToDocument(doc, { payload: { x: 1 } })).rejects.toThrow(/has no inbox/i);
});

test("opening an inbox publishes ONE address, and re-opening does not accumulate", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  const dedicated = await openDocumentInbox(doc);
  expect(await openDocumentInbox(doc)).toBe(dedicated); // idempotent

  resetRegistryCache(); // another session, not a warmed cache
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  expect(await documentInboxAddress(doc)).toBe(dedicated);
  // The deposit reaches the owner, addressed by the document alone.
  await postToDocument(doc, { payload: { signingUp: true } });
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  expect((await readInbox(dedicated)).map((d) => d.payload)).toEqual([{ signingUp: true }]);
});

test("the inbox address is machinery: it never surfaces as the document's data", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  await write(doc, SECRET, "s1");
  await openDocumentInbox(doc);

  // The consumer read returns the entity's properties and nothing of the compartment
  // that carries the address — the Header branch is beside the content, not in it.
  const subjects = await readUnion([doc]);
  const props = subjects[0]?.props ?? {};
  expect(Object.keys(props)).toEqual([SECRET]);
});

// CONNECTING APPLIES WHAT WAS DEPOSITED — and the honest scope of that claim.
//
// This was called "connecting drains BOTH levels" and asserted nothing about the second.
// An adversarial review replayed it against a `connectedUser` that drained ONLY the
// user's own two inboxes: all three assertions still passed. The reason is not a weak
// test, it is that the second level currently has **no producer**: the one call that
// deposits a cap is `inbox.share(doc, toUser)`, which resolves `userInbox(toUser,
// "protected")` (`surface/inbox.ts`) — a USER's inbox, never a document's. Nothing
// published can address a cap to a document's inbox, so draining one applies nothing and
// there is nothing to observe.
//
// That the drain covers document inboxes is therefore an ANTICIPATION, and a legitimate
// one: upstream `AddInboxCap` is generic over repos (no `is_store` check,
// `engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1916-1930`) and `InboxMsgContent::Link` exists as a
// variant. What is NOT legitimate is a test title asserting a property no code exercises.
// So this test states what it proves; the anticipation is named, not dressed up.
test("connecting applies the Links waiting for me, and leaves consumer deposits alone", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
  const pubDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
  const docInbox = await openDocumentInbox(pubDoc);

  // Two deposits, one at each level, both made by someone else.
  resetRegistryCache();
  setCurrentUser("carol");
  const carolDoc = await createEntityDoc("carol", "protected");
  await share(carolDoc, "alice"); // a Link, into ALICE's own inbox — the only cap path
  await post(docInbox, { payload: { onTheDocument: true }, ts: 2 }); // consumer data

  // Alice connects: one call, and she calls nothing to "receive".
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  await connectedUser();

  expect(hasCap(carolDoc)).toBe(true); // the Link was applied
  expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual([]); // (protDoc holds no secret here)
  const left = await readInbox(docInbox);
  expect(left.map((d) => d.payload)).toEqual([{ onTheDocument: true }]); // consumer data stays
});

// The same resolution property one level up: a user's own inbox.
//
// REGRESSION (2026-08-10, found adversarially). This test used to pass on the module
// CACHE: `userInbox` keys by (account, scope) regardless of who is asking, so Bob hit the
// entry Alice had just warmed. Nothing about persistence was exercised — the fake did not
// even answer the shim query — so in a second SESSION (or a second browser page, which is
// what the applicative e2e runs) Bob would have got a DIFFERENT inbox, and his deposit
// would have gone where nobody reads. That is the exact failure this library already paid
// for once. Dropping the cache between the two actors is what makes it a real test.
test("a third party resolves another user's inbox, from the shim and not from a cache", async () => {
  inject();
  setCurrentUser("alice");
  const aliceView = await userInbox("alice", "protected");

  resetRegistryCache(); // Bob is another session: nothing of Alice's is in memory
  setCurrentUser("bob");
  const bobView = await userInbox("alice", "protected");
  expect(bobView).toBe(aliceView);
});