Le contrat faisait porter à l'application trois choses qui sont des artefacts de notre implémentation, pas de la cible. Le rechargement de page. Au retour depuis le cache du navigateur, la barrière se rechargeait pour rejouer init() — et détruisait au passage l'état de l'application, qui ne pouvait ni s'y opposer ni nettoyer avant. Le paquet détenait pourtant ce qu'il fallait : la fonction init injectée et le callback de l'appelant. Il enregistre désormais sa délégation, ranime sa barrière au retour — champ conservé, bouton réactivé — et redélègue à la confirmation. Rien hors de la barrière n'est touché. Vérifié dans le bundle amont : en page de tête, init navigue à chaque appel, sa garde « une seule fois » ne portant que sur la branche iframe. L'ordre d'appel silencieux. ensureIdentity() attendu avant init() ne se résolvait jamais, sans erreur. Le paquet possédant la session, il distingue maintenant les deux cas sans délai ni heuristique : session pas encore arrivée → il attend ; init jamais appelé → elle n'arrivera pas, il lève en nommant l'appel à faire d'abord. Et la clause qui annonçait la barrière était rangée dans les exigences de déploiement, alors qu'une application n'y peut rien. Elle passe dans les garanties, avec ce qui la remplace : la page n'est jamais rechargée. Il reste deux lignes d'exigences : servir le fichier de portefeuille, et appeler init avant d'attendre l'identité — ce qui échoue désormais bruyamment.
@ng-eventually/polyfill
One entry point. Most of what it publishes has the same signature as the future SDK —
ng, useShape, watchShape, docs, inbox, storeRegistry, readUnion (+ types) —
and is a drop-in for @ng-org/web / @ng-org/orm: as NextGraph matures it resolves to
the real SDK (build alias removed) with no code change.
One call does not, and it is the whole of what you will delete: configure. It
exists because one shared wallet hosts every user; upstream, an application imports the
SDK and each user opens their own wallet. src/index.ts groups it under a heading that
says so. (ensureIdentity is a second in substance — the shared-wallet gate — but its
call site survives: an application still awaits a session before it renders.)
(There were two entry points until 2026-08-07, . and ./polyfill, and the second one
WAS that list. One door is easier to import from and says less — hence the grouping, and
hence docs/api-contract.md, whose export inventory a test keeps honest.)
Per-symbol, with the target signature and an epistemic label on every claim:
docs/api-contract.md.
Reading is key possession, and the isolation here is still fake. The cap surface has the shape of the real model — you hold a document's
ReadCapor you do not read it, and there is no authorization list anywhere — but nothing is encrypted yet and the stand-in key is a constant. Nothing this library does may be described as "anonymous" or "private" until cap-enforcement lands per-document encryption.
import {
// SDK-shaped — the real SDK replaces these in place.
ensureIdentity, storeRegistry, inbox, readUnion, docs,
// Polyfill-era — one call, and it is the whole of what goes away.
configure,
} from "@ng-eventually/polyfill";
configure({ ng: realNg, useShape: realUseShape, getSession, sharedWallet });
await ensureIdentity(); // who I am (returned), connection work awaited
const doc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("protected");
await docs.sparqlUpdate(sid, `INSERT DATA { … }`, doc);
const subjects = await readUnion(await storeRegistry.listMyEntityDocs("protected"));
Principle — the polyfill compensates, it never extends
Its only reason to exist is to bridge a NextGraph implementation gap. Every non-SDK surface must map to something NextGraph will provide natively, and must fall away at that point — no bespoke features, no observability, no convenience API that isn't strictly "NextGraph will do this later". The test for any proposed addition: does it compensate a real, exhibited gap? If not, it belongs in the consumer application. And a compensation whose gap is not actually exhibited on the target broker is dead weight, not defensive code.
Both halves are binding — the surface AND the implementation stay as close as possible to what NextGraph plans. The question to ask at every choice: would this make a caller learn something it has to UNLEARN at migration? If yes, it is a deviation, whatever it buys.
What the polyfill adds, each emulated now and native later:
- Shared-wallet identity — one wallet hosts every user, so the library fabricates
virtual users and confines every access to the connected one
(
emulated-verifier/reach.ts). Upstream, each user opens their own wallet. - Capability emulation — per-identity cap possession plus a read filter over it: you read the documents whose cap you hold. There is no authorization list, because the real model has none.
- Inbox —
post,postToDocument,share, and the recipient's processing. The model is verified (an inbox is a keypair on one repo); no JS surface exists yet.
Generic by construction: no application domain here. See
examples/notebook for an application written against it,
which the e2e suite drives.
How a document is reached — the three acts, and no others
import { storeRegistry, inbox, readUnion } from "@ng-eventually/polyfill";
// 1. CREATE — you hold its cap, with nothing to declare. No identity parameter: a
// session belongs to one user, exactly as the target's own `doc_create` assumes.
const doc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("protected");
// 2. GIVE TO READ — name the document and the person. The key is looked up and
// sealed into a deposit; the recipient applies it by connecting, with nothing
// to call. Irreversible: there is no revoking a key already handed out.
await inbox.share(doc, "bob");
// 3. CIRCULATE THE REFERENCE — no call at all. Every reference this surface returns
// is BARE: it names the document and grants nothing. If the document sits in a
// PUBLIC store, the store serves its read cap to whoever asks, so the bare
// reference is enough to read it — and if it does not, the reference still names
// it and opens nothing.
const publicDoc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("public");
// …put `publicDoc` in a QR code, a message, another document. Nothing else to do.
await readUnion([publicDoc]); // a stranger holding only this reads it
The invariant behind all three: you never derive a cap from a bare reference. You
look it up in what you hold, you were given it, or a public store served it. A
did:ng:o:… without :r: names a document and opens nothing — which is what makes
confidentiality composable: a widely circulated document may point at a restricted
one, and following the reference gets you a name, not a key. See
docs/readcap-and-nuri-model.md § 0.
The types carry that invariant
Nuri and ReadCap are template literal types, not string aliases:
type Nuri = `did:ng:${string}`
type ReadCap = `did:ng:${string}:r:${string}`
They are still strings — assignable to string, JSON-serializable, no wrapper — but
the distinction is checked. A ReadCap goes wherever a Nuri is expected (a cap is
a NURI with the key inside); the reverse does not compile.
Permissive in, precise out. Public entries take NuriLike (Nuri | string) and
validate at the door, so a value coming from storage, a URL or a form needs no
narrowing and no cast on your side; what they return is a precise Nuri. The
runtime checks stay regardless — a JavaScript caller never meets the compiler.
const saved = localStorage.getItem("doc"); // string | null
if (saved) await readUnion([saved]); // ✓ validated at the door