Trois appelants veulent la même chose — un portefeuille neuf, ses octets et son mot de passe : la suite du polyfill à son démarrage, la suite d'une application au sien, et un humain une fois pour provisionner un déploiement. Rien ne produisait ce fichier ; il fallait aller le chercher à la main sur nextgraph.eu. Mêmes entrées, mêmes sorties, mais des appelants de nature différente : une suite ne va pas lancer un sous-processus et analyser sa sortie, et un humain ne va pas écrire un fichier jetable pour appeler une fonction. Donc une fonction, et un script mince par-dessus. mintWalletBytes(password, name) rend les OCTETS, pas un chemin. C'est une correction de ce qui existait : exportWalletFile imposait le disque à tout le monde, et la suite applicative écrivait un fichier temporaire pour le relire aussitôt en mémoire, puis devait le nettoyer. Elle ne le fait plus — serveApp prend les octets. Qui veut un fichier l'écrit ; personne n'y est forcé. Le script exige --password et refuse d'en inventer un, et refuse d'écraser un .ngw existant sans --force, vérifié AVANT de fabriquer quoi que ce soit. Exécuté pour de vrai : 800 octets, et le mot de passe imprimé est celui passé en entrée. C'est le seul des trois cas qu'aucune suite n'exerce, donc le seul qui pouvait être livré cassé sans que rien ne le dise. Ce qui ne change pas : les suites fabriquent un portefeuille par exécution et n'en héritent jamais ; le provisionnement veut l'inverse, durable et conservé. Ils partagent la fabrication et l'export, ils divergent sur la durée de vie. Les identifiants en dur deviennent un paramètre — les suites passent toujours les leurs, le script prend ceux qu'on lui donne, et il n'existe aucun mot de passe par défaut.
@ng-eventually/polyfill
One entry point. Most of what it publishes has the same signature as the future SDK —
ng, useShape, watchShape, docs, inbox, storeRegistry, readUnion (+ types) —
and is a drop-in for @ng-org/web / @ng-org/orm: as NextGraph matures it resolves to
the real SDK (build alias removed) with no code change.
One call does not, and it is the whole of what you will delete: configure. It
exists because one shared wallet hosts every user; upstream, an application imports the
SDK and each user opens their own wallet. src/index.ts groups it under a heading that
says so. (ensureIdentity is a second in substance — the shared-wallet gate — but its
call site survives: an application still awaits a session before it renders.)
(There were two entry points until 2026-08-07, . and ./polyfill, and the second one
WAS that list. One door is easier to import from and says less — hence the grouping, and
hence docs/api-contract.md, whose export inventory a test keeps honest.)
Per-symbol, with the target signature and an epistemic label on every claim:
docs/api-contract.md.
Reading is key possession, and the isolation here is still fake. The cap surface has the shape of the real model — you hold a document's
ReadCapor you do not read it, and there is no authorization list anywhere — but nothing is encrypted yet and the stand-in key is a constant. Nothing this library does may be described as "anonymous" or "private" until cap-enforcement lands per-document encryption.
import {
// SDK-shaped — the real SDK replaces these in place.
ensureIdentity, storeRegistry, inbox, readUnion, docs,
// Polyfill-era — one call, and it is the whole of what goes away.
configure,
} from "@ng-eventually/polyfill";
configure({ ng: realNg, useShape: realUseShape, getSession, sharedWallet });
await ensureIdentity(); // who I am (returned), connection work awaited
const doc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("protected");
await docs.sparqlUpdate(sid, `INSERT DATA { … }`, doc);
const subjects = await readUnion(await storeRegistry.listMyEntityDocs("protected"));
Principle — the polyfill compensates, it never extends
Its only reason to exist is to bridge a NextGraph implementation gap. Every non-SDK surface must map to something NextGraph will provide natively, and must fall away at that point — no bespoke features, no observability, no convenience API that isn't strictly "NextGraph will do this later". The test for any proposed addition: does it compensate a real, exhibited gap? If not, it belongs in the consumer application. And a compensation whose gap is not actually exhibited on the target broker is dead weight, not defensive code.
Both halves are binding — the surface AND the implementation stay as close as possible to what NextGraph plans. The question to ask at every choice: would this make a caller learn something it has to UNLEARN at migration? If yes, it is a deviation, whatever it buys.
What the polyfill adds, each emulated now and native later:
- Shared-wallet identity — one wallet hosts every user, so the library fabricates
virtual users and confines every access to the connected one
(
emulated-verifier/reach.ts). Upstream, each user opens their own wallet. - Capability emulation — per-identity cap possession plus a read filter over it: you read the documents whose cap you hold. There is no authorization list, because the real model has none.
- Inbox —
post,postToDocument,share, and the recipient's processing. The model is verified (an inbox is a keypair on one repo); no JS surface exists yet.
Generic by construction: no application domain here. See
examples/notebook for an application written against it,
which the e2e suite drives.
How a document is reached — the three acts, and no others
import { storeRegistry, inbox, readUnion } from "@ng-eventually/polyfill";
// 1. CREATE — you hold its cap, with nothing to declare. No identity parameter: a
// session belongs to one user, exactly as the target's own `doc_create` assumes.
const doc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("protected");
// 2. GIVE TO READ — name the document and the person. The key is looked up and
// sealed into a deposit; the recipient applies it by connecting, with nothing
// to call. Irreversible: there is no revoking a key already handed out.
await inbox.share(doc, "bob");
// 3. CIRCULATE THE REFERENCE — no call at all. Every reference this surface returns
// is BARE: it names the document and grants nothing. If the document sits in a
// PUBLIC store, the store serves its read cap to whoever asks, so the bare
// reference is enough to read it — and if it does not, the reference still names
// it and opens nothing.
const publicDoc = await storeRegistry.createEntityDoc("public");
// …put `publicDoc` in a QR code, a message, another document. Nothing else to do.
await readUnion([publicDoc]); // a stranger holding only this reads it
The invariant behind all three: you never derive a cap from a bare reference. You
look it up in what you hold, you were given it, or a public store served it. A
did:ng:o:… without :r: names a document and opens nothing — which is what makes
confidentiality composable: a widely circulated document may point at a restricted
one, and following the reference gets you a name, not a key. See
docs/readcap-and-nuri-model.md § 0.
The types carry that invariant
Nuri and ReadCap are template literal types, not string aliases:
type Nuri = `did:ng:${string}`
type ReadCap = `did:ng:${string}:r:${string}`
They are still strings — assignable to string, JSON-serializable, no wrapper — but
the distinction is checked. A ReadCap goes wherever a Nuri is expected (a cap is
a NURI with the key inside); the reverse does not compile.
Permissive in, precise out. Public entries take NuriLike (Nuri | string) and
validate at the door, so a value coming from storage, a URL or a form needs no
narrowing and no cast on your side; what they return is a precise Nuri. The
runtime checks stay regardless — a JavaScript caller never meets the compiler.
const saved = localStorage.getItem("doc"); // string | null
if (saved) await readUnion([saved]); // ✓ validated at the door