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ng-eventually/packages/sdk/src/emulated-verifier/branch-registers.ts
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Sylvain Duchesne b5f05472d9 fix: second tour adverse — mes correctifs avaient quatre trous, dont un qui les annulait
J'ai relancé un adversaire sur les correctifs du commit précédent, comme la règle
l'exige. Il en a trouvé quatre. Le premier annulait la garde que je venais d'écrire.

**Le registre de propriété était écrivable depuis la surface publiée.** `assertMayWrite`
lit la propriété dans l'index de store de l'appelant — et `caps.open` marquait les
documents de STRUCTURE (les trois stores, les inbox) comme « créés par moi ». Donc un
porteur pouvait, par le `docs.sparqlUpdate` publié, insérer `contains "<n'importe quel
document>"` dans son propre index et s'en déclarer propriétaire. Démontré : Bob écrit dans
le document protégé d'Alice, et détourne l'inbox d'un de ses documents — exactement le
vecteur que le commit précédent prétendait fermer. `open` classe désormais sans marquer :
un document de structure n'est possédé par personne au sens de la paternité, donc les deux
moitiés de la garde répondent non, ce qui est correct.

**`inbox.post` acceptait n'importe quel NURI.** Déplacer `depositInto` hors de la surface
ne suffisait pas : `post` atteint la même porte, qui saute les deux gardes par
conception. Bob, ne détenant rien, écrivait quatre triplets dans le document d'Alice. En
amont la confusion est impossible — `InboxPost` scelle vers une CLÉ d'inbox et le broker
route par `inboxes: PubKey → RepoId` ; adresser un document n'est pas refusé, c'est
inexprimable. Le shim tient maintenant un index des inbox, l'équivalent émulé de ce que
le broker sait par construction, et `post` refuse ce qui n'en est pas une.

**Le filtre de lecture fuyait encore par les clés dunder.** `DeepSignalSet` expose la
collection brute sur `__raw__` / `__meta__` : `[...view]` rendait zéro élément pendant que
`view.__raw__` rendait le Set complet, tous utilisateurs confondus. Mon en-tête affirmait
qu'« une propriété simple ne porte aucun élément » — faux pour ce type.

**Et il cassait des membres légitimes** : ma liste blanche couvrait la moitié des
helpers d'itération, si bien que `toArray`, `reduce`, `first`, `take`, `drop`, `flatMap`
levaient sur les données du porteur lui-même. Tous filtrés désormais ; le refus ne vaut
que pour l'inconnu.

**Deux tests réparés à la source plutôt qu'en affaiblissant les gardes.** Le faux
`doc_create` de `inbox.test.ts` rendait une CONSTANTE — tous les documents créés étaient
le même NURI, donc la garde de propriété n'avait rien à distinguer et deux tests lisaient
l'inbox d'Alice sous l'identité de Bob sans que rien ne proteste. Et le harnais e2e
utilisait un document ordinaire comme inbox.

Enfin, mon propre cache d'inbox a reproduit la faute que la revue avait relevée ailleurs :
un mémo qui survit à sa session. Rattaché à `resetRegistryCache`.

189 tests unitaires (six régressions de plus), e2e 40/40 et applicatif 10/10 — après un
échec réseau non reproductible, relancé sans modification.
2026-08-07 14:26:32 +02:00

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/**
* The durable cap/inbox registers — this library's stand-in for the compartments the
* verifier maintains on a repo's own branches.
*
* Upstream these are not RDF at all: they are streams of service commits on branches
* whose CRDT is `BranchCrdt::None` (`engine/repo/src/types.rs:1420`). Each register here
* names its native counterpart:
*
* - **Store branch** — `AddRepo { read_cap }` (`engine/repo/src/types.rs:1890-1899`):
* the cap of a document you CREATED, filed beside the store that holds it. Replaying
* it is what reloads a store's documents with their keys (`AddRepo::verify` ->
* `Verifier::load_repo_from_read_cap`, `engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:2237`).
* - **User branch, links** — `AddLink { read_cap }` (`types.rs:1939-1948`), *"so that a
* user can share with all its device a new Link they received"*, external repos only.
* - **User branch, inbox caps** — `AddInboxCap { repo_id, overlay, priv_key }`
* (`types.rs:1969-1981`): which inboxes you may READ. Keyed by `repo_id`, hence valid
* for ANY repo — `update_inbox_cap_v0` applies it with no `is_store` check
* (`engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1920`).
* - **Header branch** — a document's deposit ADDRESS, readable by any holder of it.
* The one register with NO native counterpart: upstream an address is TRANSMITTED
* (a message, a profile QR code), never published, and `inboxes: PubKey -> RepoId` is
* a per-session local table (`verifier.rs:105`). Publishing is our divergence, taken
* because an emulation has no message channel — see
* `docs/briefs/2026-08-03-document-inbox-addressing.md`.
*
* Why separate from the shim next door: these emulate the VERIFIER's bookkeeping and
* survive conceptually — at migration the native side keeps them, only our RDF
* representation goes. `shared-wallet/account-registry.ts` has no counterpart at all and
* evaporates. One file until 2026-08-03, two fates.
*
* The imports back into `shared-wallet/` are deliberate, visible cross-fate edges: a
* register needs the shim to know WHOSE it is, and where its store document lives. Every
* use sits inside a function body, so the module cycle is inert at evaluation time.
*/
import { sparqlQuery } from "../surface/docs";
import { registerUpdate } from "./register-write";
import { getCaps, getCurrentUser } from "../shared-wallet/bootstrap";
import { escapeLiteral } from "../surface/sparql";
import { hasReadCap, isNuri } from "../model/nuri";
import { mustNotAttempt } from "./reach";
import { fetchReadCap } from "./public-store";
import { ensureRepoOpen } from "./open-repo";
import { accessLogPrefix } from "../shared-wallet/access-log";
import {
P,
USER_BRANCH_SUBJECT,
STORE_BRANCH_SUBJECT,
HEADER_BRANCH_SUBJECT,
accountKey,
session,
readBindings,
bindingValue,
resolveAccount,
storeOf,
readUserStore,
userInbox,
createDoc,
ensureAccount,
recordInbox,
type VirtualUserRecord,
} from "../shared-wallet/account-registry";
import type { InboxScope, Nuri, ReadCap, Scope } from "../model/types";
/**
* Does `nuri` belong to the CURRENT wallet as one of its inboxes? The predicate the
* inbox read guard consults (`inbox.ts`). Anonymous holds no inbox, so it is false
* for everyone until an identity is set.
*/
export async function isOwnInbox(nuri: Nuri): Promise<boolean> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return false;
// Either of the user's two inboxes counts as its own.
for (const scope of ["public", "protected"] as const) {
if ((await userInbox(holder, scope)) === nuri) return true;
}
// …and the inbox of any document this user opened one on (the emulated
// `AddInboxCap` records on its User branch).
return (await readInboxCapPairs()).some((p) => p.inbox === nuri);
}
// --- the cap side of a user's store ----------------------------------
/**
* File the caps of documents the CURRENT holder owns into what they hold — the
* emulated `AddRepo { read_cap }`.
*
* Upstream, creating a document commits an `AddRepo { read_cap }` into a typed
* branch of the store, and that branch — listing the store's documents, each with
* its read key — carries the owner's caps. Here the per-(account × scope) index
* document plays the store-container role, so it carries the caps too: a
* document appended to it on creation, or read back from it on a later session,
* puts its cap in the owner's hands with nothing for the consumer to do. That is
* what makes the invariant hold both ways — you never derive a cap from a bare
* reference, and yet a document's own creator is never locked out of it.
*
* Scoped to the current holder ON PURPOSE: another account's documents are listed
* by the cross-account fan-out (`listEntityDocs`), and those caps are emphatically
* not ours to hold. `id` is compared through the shim key, so it matches however
* the consumer spells the identity.
*/
export function holdOwnCap(id: string, scope: Scope, doc: Nuri, cap: ReadCap): void {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null || accountKey(holder) !== accountKey(id)) return;
const caps = getCaps();
// `learn(cap)`, not `open(doc, scope)` — the cap must be the SAME value that was
// written to the Store branch, not a second one minted from the NURI. They agree
// today only because the stand-in value is a constant; with a real key (P1b) a
// second mint would produce a DIFFERENT key and the document would be unreadable
// by the very session that created it. Mint once, store it, hold that one.
caps.learn(cap);
// Which store the document sits in is a registry fact, applied separately — and a
// MARK only, for the same reason the cap above is learned rather than re-minted.
if (scope === "public") caps.markInPublicStore(doc);
}
/**
* File the caps of the documents a virtual user owns BY BEING one: its three
* stores, and its inbox. They are as much its documents as any entity it creates,
* and without them it cannot even list its own content — the boundary would lock a
* user out of itself.
*
* Scoped to the current holder, like {@link holdOwnCap}: another user's stores are
* emphatically not ours to hold.
*/
export function fileOwnStructure(id: string, record: VirtualUserRecord): void {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null || accountKey(holder) !== accountKey(id)) return;
const caps = getCaps();
if (record.docPublic) caps.open(record.docPublic, "public");
if (record.docProtected) caps.open(record.docProtected, "protected");
if (record.docPrivate) caps.open(record.docPrivate, "private");
}
/** Same, for the user's own inbox — it is its document, and it must be able to
* read it. Depositing into someone else's needs no cap (see `register-write.depositInto`). */
export function fileOwnInbox(id: string, inbox: Nuri): void {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null || accountKey(holder) !== accountKey(id)) return;
getCaps().open(inbox, "private");
}
// --- per-entity documents + per-scope index -------------------------------
/**
* Publish WHERE to deposit for `doc`, on its Header branch — the compartment any
* holder of the document can read.
*
* Replacement, not addition: a document has exactly ONE inbox upstream (the verifier's
* `inboxes: PubKey → RepoId` is a function, and `repo.inbox` a single `Option<PrivKey>`),
* so two addresses on one document is a state the model has no meaning for — and a
* depositor picking the stale one writes where nobody reads.
*/
export async function publishInboxAddress(doc: Nuri, inbox: Nuri): Promise<void> {
const s = await session();
try {
// Two separate updates, not one compound statement: `DELETE WHERE { … }` is the
// form verified against the real broker (see
// `docs/decisions/sparql-delete-for-orm-objects.md`), whereas a `;`-joined update
// is not exercised anywhere in this lib.
await registerUpdate(
s.sessionId,
`DELETE WHERE { <${HEADER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.inboxAddress}> ?a }`,
doc,
"publishInboxAddress:clear",
);
await registerUpdate(
s.sessionId,
`INSERT DATA { <${HEADER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.inboxAddress}> "${escapeLiteral(inbox)}" }`,
doc,
"publishInboxAddress",
);
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " publishInboxAddress failed:", error);
}
}
/**
* The ReadCaps recorded on a store's Store branch — its documents, each with its
* key. The emulated replay of `AddRepo`, and the reason a fresh session recovers
* what it owns without recomputing anything.
*/
export async function readStoreCaps(storeDoc: Nuri): Promise<ReadCap[]> {
const s = await session();
const out: ReadCap[] = [];
try {
const res = await sparqlQuery(
s.sessionId,
`SELECT ?c WHERE { <${STORE_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.readCap}> ?c }`,
undefined,
storeDoc,
"readStoreCaps",
);
for (const row of readBindings(res)) {
const v = bindingValue(row, "c");
if (v && hasReadCap(v)) out.push(v);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " readStoreCaps failed:", error);
}
return out;
}
/**
* WHERE to deposit for `doc` — its inbox address, or `undefined` if its owner never
* opened one. The deposit-side counterpart of {@link openDocumentInbox}, and the
* function an app calls before `inbox.post`.
*
* Readable by whoever can read the document, because it lives on its Header branch —
* an address is public by nature (upstream a depositor needs only the inbox PUBLIC
* key). Conversely someone who cannot read the document learns nothing, which is
* faithful too: upstream the inbox pubkey is not derivable from a RepoId, it has to
* reach you.
*
* **Never creates.** Asking where to deposit must not bring an inbox into existence —
* only its owner opens one, and only on its own document.
*/
export async function documentInboxAddress(doc: Nuri): Promise<Nuri | undefined> {
// RULE 2 — do not even attempt. Not holding the document, we have no address to
// find: upstream the inbox pubkey travels WITH what you can read, so "where do I
// deposit for a document I cannot read" is not a refused question, it is a question
// with no referent. Answering `undefined` here keeps the caller's shape (an address
// or none) instead of turning the boundary into an exception it must catch.
// …but ask the (emulated) network first: a document in a public store serves its cap
// to whoever asks (public-store.ts), and "where do I deposit for this public
// document" is exactly the question a third party arrives with, holding nothing but
// the reference.
await fetchReadCap(doc);
if (mustNotAttempt(doc)) return undefined;
const s = await session();
try {
const res = await sparqlQuery(
s.sessionId,
`SELECT ?a WHERE { <${HEADER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.inboxAddress}> ?a }`,
undefined,
doc,
"documentInboxAddress",
);
for (const row of readBindings(res)) {
const a = bindingValue(row, "a");
if (a && isNuri(a)) return a;
}
} catch (error) {
// Unreadable document (no cap) or not synced → no address to give. Refusing to
// read is the boundary doing its job, not an error to propagate here.
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " documentInboxAddress failed:", error);
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Does the connected user own `doc`? Answered from its **Store branches** — the
* register of the documents it created — across the three scopes, which is the only
* place that records authorship. Holding a cap is NOT ownership: a cap can be
* received, and a recipient must not be able to open an inbox on what it merely reads.
*/
export async function ownsDocument(doc: Nuri): Promise<boolean> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return false;
const record = await resolveAccount(holder);
if (record === null) return false;
for (const scope of ["public", "protected", "private"] as const) {
const store = storeOf(record, scope);
if (!store) continue;
if ((await readUserStore(store)).includes(doc)) return true;
}
return false;
}
/** The `(document, inbox)` pairs recorded on this user's User branch. */
/**
* Encode the `(document, inbox)` pair of an emulated `AddInboxCap` record.
*
* Upstream this is a TYPED structure — `AddInboxCapV0 { repo_id, overlay, priv_key }`
* (`engine/repo/src/types.rs:1973`) — carried by a service commit, not a string. Ours is
* one RDF literal because our User branch is a subject in a document, so the pairing has
* to live inside a value. That is the emulation's shape, and it is what migration
* replaces: the fields become fields again.
*
* The separator is a space, which is safe for a reason worth stating rather than
* assuming: a NURI is `did:ng:` followed by base64url and `:`-separated segments
* (`NuriV0`, `engine/net/src/app_protocol.rs`), an alphabet that contains no space. The
* assertion below turns that from an implicit property into a checked one — a silently
* mis-split pair would file an inbox under a truncated document and lose deposits with
* no error, which is exactly the failure class this whole path already paid for once.
*/
function encodeInboxCap(doc: Nuri, inbox: Nuri): string {
if (doc.includes(" ") || inbox.includes(" ")) {
throw new Error(
"[ng-eventually] branch-registers: a NURI containing a space cannot be paired in " +
`an inbox-cap record — the separator would be ambiguous: ${JSON.stringify([doc, inbox])}`,
);
}
return `${doc} ${inbox}`;
}
export async function readInboxCapPairs(): Promise<Array<{ doc: Nuri; inbox: Nuri }>> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return [];
const record = await resolveAccount(holder);
const store = record?.docPrivate;
if (!store) return [];
const s = await session();
const out: Array<{ doc: Nuri; inbox: Nuri }> = [];
try {
const res = await sparqlQuery(
s.sessionId,
`SELECT ?c WHERE { <${USER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.inboxCap}> ?c }`,
undefined,
store,
"readInboxCaps",
);
for (const row of readBindings(res)) {
// See `encodeInboxCap` for why a space is a safe separator here, and why this
// pairing exists at all.
const [doc, inbox] = bindingValue(row, "c").split(" ");
if (doc && inbox && isNuri(doc) && isNuri(inbox)) out.push({ doc, inbox });
}
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " readInboxCaps failed:", error);
}
return out;
}
/** The inbox recorded for one document, if this user opened one. */
export async function readInboxCapsFor(doc: Nuri): Promise<Nuri | undefined> {
return (await readInboxCapPairs()).find((p) => p.doc === doc)?.inbox;
}
/**
* Every inbox this user may READ: its own, plus one per document it opened an
* inbox on. What `connect.connectedUser` drains, and what `isOwnInbox` answers from.
*/
export async function myInboxes(): Promise<Nuri[]> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return [];
const out: Nuri[] = [];
// BOTH of the user's inboxes — public and protected — since upstream a site carries
// one on each of those two store repos (`engine/verifier/src/site.rs:127-152`).
if ((await resolveAccount(holder)) !== null) {
for (const scope of ["public", "protected"] as const) out.push(await userInbox(holder, scope));
}
for (const { inbox } of await readInboxCapPairs()) out.push(inbox);
return out;
}
/**
* File a cap received for someone ELSE's document — the emulated
* `AddLink { read_cap }` on the User branch of the current user's private store.
*
* This is what makes a received cap DURABLE. Before it, a shared document survived
* only by re-reading the inbox every session, which uses a queue as a database:
* upstream an inbox is consumed, and processing a message *applies* it. Applying a
* Link means writing it here.
*
* Idempotent — re-applying the same Link is a no-op, so re-processing an inbox
* (a second tab, a reconnect) costs nothing.
*/
export async function addLink(cap: ReadCap): Promise<void> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return;
const record = await ensureAccount(holder);
const store = record.docPrivate;
if (!store) return;
if ((await readLinks()).includes(cap)) return;
const s = await session();
try {
await registerUpdate(
s.sessionId,
`INSERT DATA { <${USER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.link}> "${escapeLiteral(cap)}" }`,
store,
"addLink",
);
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " addLink failed:", error);
}
}
/**
* The caps this user has received and applied — the User branch read back. Called
* at connection to restore what was shared with them, without touching any inbox.
*/
export async function readLinks(): Promise<ReadCap[]> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) return [];
const record = await ensureAccount(holder);
const store = record.docPrivate;
if (!store) return [];
const s = await session();
const out: ReadCap[] = [];
await ensureRepoOpen(store);
try {
const res = await sparqlQuery(
s.sessionId,
`SELECT ?c WHERE { <${USER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.link}> ?c }`,
undefined,
store,
"readLinks",
);
for (const row of readBindings(res)) {
const v = bindingValue(row, "c");
if (v && hasReadCap(v)) out.push(v);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " readLinks failed:", error);
}
return out;
}
/**
* The inbox of a document this user owns — resolved, and created on first ask.
*
* Upstream a repo carries `inbox: Option<PrivKey>` (`engine/repo/src/repo.rs:126`):
* an inbox is a keypair on the repo, whose PRIVATE half its owner holds. That half is
* recorded with `AddInboxCap { repo_id, overlay, priv_key }` — *"into the user branch,
* so that a user can share with all its device"* (`engine/repo/src/types.rs:1973`), the
* same branch that carries `AddLink`. So "which inboxes may I read" is answered by the
* User branch, and that is what this emulates.
*
* **The engine SUPPORTS this; nothing exercises it automatically.** Those are two
* different statements, and conflating them is what made an earlier version of this
* comment call the feature an "anticipation". It is not. `inbox: Option<PrivKey>` is a
* field of EVERY `Repo` (`engine/repo/src/repo.rs:126`), not of a store structure;
* `AddInboxCapV0` is keyed by `repo_id` (`engine/repo/src/types.rs:1973`); and
* `update_inbox_cap_v0` applies it with `self.repos.get_mut(repo_id)` and **no
* `is_store` check of any kind** (`engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1920`). Generic by
* construction, and at any time (see the User-branch note above).
*
* What is true is narrower: no code path CREATES one for a document — `new_store_default`
* attaches one only `if !private` (`verifier.rs:2994`), `doc_create` leaves `inbox: None`
* (`repo.rs:574`), and the only two `AddInboxCap` commits in the engine are for the
* public and protected STORE repos (`engine/verifier/src/site.rs:128,149`). So the
* capability exists and is simply unexposed above level 1: this function is aligned on
* the engine's model, it does not bet past it.
*
* Lazy on purpose, for the same reason: creating an inbox document for every entity up
* front would double every `createEntityDoc` for inboxes most documents never receive
* anything in. Upstream the keypair is cheap; here an inbox is a document, so it is
* minted when first asked for.
*
* *(Not covered: ROTATING an inbox key — the engine's "update" case with a new
* `priv_key`. This function is idempotent and returns the existing inbox instead. A
* known limit, not an oversight.)*
*
* Only for a document this user OWNS — see {@link ownsDocument}. Opening an inbox on
* someone else's document would be usurpation, not a courtesy: the opener keeps the
* reading half, so it would silently divert to itself the deposits meant for the
* owner. To deposit into someone else's document, resolve
* {@link documentInboxAddress} and `inbox.post` into it.
*/
export async function openDocumentInbox(doc: Nuri): Promise<Nuri> {
const holder = getCurrentUser();
if (holder === null) throw new Error("[ng-eventually] openDocumentInbox: no identity is set");
const known = (await readInboxCapsFor(doc)) ?? null;
if (known) return known;
// OWNERSHIP is the criterion, and holding a cap is NOT ownership — a cap can be
// received. Opening an inbox is what PUBLISHES this document's address, so a
// non-owner doing it would route the owner's deposits to itself, silently, on a
// document it merely reads.
//
// **This guard compensates OUR design, not an upstream constraint** — an earlier
// comment here claimed "upstream only the owner can commit `AddInboxCap`", which is
// false: that commit lands on the committer's OWN User branch, so anyone may write
// one naming anyone's repo. What protects upstream is that an inbox address is never
// PUBLISHED — it is TRANSMITTED (in a `ContactDetails` message, or a profile QR
// code), and `inboxes: PubKey → RepoId` is a per-verifier local table
// (`engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:105`, rebuilt empty each session). A forged pair
// reaches nobody, because nobody was told about it.
//
// We publish instead of transmitting — the only way a third party can find the
// address at all here — which creates a vector upstream does not have: whoever can
// write the document can redirect its deposits. Hence this guard. It is a real
// divergence, deliberately taken; see `docs/briefs/2026-08-03-document-inbox-addressing.md`.
if (!(await ownsDocument(doc))) {
throw new Error(
"[ng-eventually] openDocumentInbox: refused — you may only open an inbox on a document " +
`you own. Deposit into its published address instead (storeRegistry.documentInboxAddress ` +
`then inbox.post): ${JSON.stringify(doc)}`,
);
}
const inbox = await createDoc();
const s = await session();
const record = await ensureAccount(holder);
const store = record.docPrivate;
getCaps().open(inbox, "private"); // its owner holds it, like any document of theirs
// …and the shim records that it IS an inbox, so a depositor can find that out without
// holding anything of it. See `recordInbox`: upstream a deposit cannot address a plain
// document at all, and this is what stands in for that impossibility.
await recordInbox(inbox);
if (store) {
try {
await registerUpdate(
s.sessionId,
`INSERT DATA { <${USER_BRANCH_SUBJECT}> <${P.inboxCap}> "${escapeLiteral(encodeInboxCap(doc, inbox))}" }`,
store,
"openDocumentInbox",
);
} catch (error) {
console.error(accessLogPrefix() + " openDocumentInbox persist failed:", error);
}
}
// …and the PUBLIC half, in the document itself, so a depositor can find it at all.
// Without this the inbox is reachable only by its owner — the opposite of what an
// inbox is for, and the bug this path shipped with.
await publishInboxAddress(doc, inbox);
return inbox;
}