Files
ng-eventually/packages/client
Sylvain Duchesne bd48b16e31 fix(client): résolution de compte DÉTERMINISTE + anti-fork restauré
Cause racine du bug de reconnexion (probe contrôlé répété) : le shim d'un compte
accumule des `docPublic`/`docProtected` EN DOUBLE (forks passés), et
resolveAccount/indexDocOf les choisissaient de façon NON-DÉTERMINISTE → l'écrivain
et le lecteur (page fraîche) ancraient sur des docs d'index DIFFÉRENTS → lecture 0.

Fix :
- `canonicalDoc()`/`recordFromRows()` : parmi plusieurs valeurs d'un scope, choisir
  le NURI lexicographiquement le plus petit (les NURIs sont content-addressed →
  ordre total stable). Écrivain et lecteur résolvent TOUJOURS le même doc, même sur
  un shim corrompu par des doublons.
- `resolveAccountReliably` RESTAURÉ (retry borné avant provision sur read shim 0 à
  froid) : j'avais retiré l'anti-fork à tort (`38b1521`) — le gap EST exhibé (fork
  non-déterministe au cold-read), et la barrière `user_connect` n'est PAS accessible
  côté JS → un retry borné est la compensation légitime (pas la barrière-store
  cassée de `45dbd9a`). Budget injecté `provisionRetry` ; défaut attempts:1 (fakes
  synchrones), app/e2e attempts:8.

anti-fork.test.ts réécrit : docPublic dupliqué → même canonique ; retry sur lag →
réutilise ; neuf → provision 1×.

gate : tsc 0 ; bun test 122 ; test:e2e 42/42 (CONTRACT 2 non-fork vert).

Portée : corrige la couche docPublic de la reconnexion. Une couche PROTECTED
distincte (watchShape protected ne converge pas à froid) reste — diagnostic en cours.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 10:24:58 +02:00
..

@ng-eventually/client

Two entry points — the data-plane is SDK-identical, the polyfill bootstrap is separate:

Import Surface
@ng-eventually/client The same signature as the SDK — ng, useShape, inbox (+ types). A drop-in for @ng-org/web / @ng-org/orm; as NextGraph matures it resolves to the real SDK (build alias removed) with no code change.
@ng-eventually/client/polyfill The only non-SDK surface — configure, setCurrentUser, and capability helpers (getCaps, grantRead, canRead/canWrite). It falls away as NextGraph matures.
// bootstrap (the only non-SDK call) — inject the real SDK
import { configure } from "@ng-eventually/client/polyfill";
configure({ ng: realNg, useShape: realUseShape, sharedWallet, currentUser });

// from here on, a pure SDK surface:
import { ng, useShape, inbox } from "@ng-eventually/client";
await ng.doc_create(/* … */);
const set = useShape(MyShape, scope);   // filtered to what the identity may read
await inbox.post(targetInbox, ref);     // deposit (anticipated SDK API)

Principle — the polyfill compensates, it never extends

The polyfill's ONLY reason to exist is to bridge a NextGraph implementation gap or a bug. Every non-SDK surface must map to a capability NextGraph will provide natively, and must fall away at that point. The polyfill MUST NOT add functionality of its own — no bespoke features, no observability/tooling, no convenience API that isn't strictly "NextGraph will do this natively later." The test for any proposed addition: does it compensate a real, exhibited NextGraph gap or bug? If not, it does not belong here — build it in the consumer application, not in the polyfill. Corollary: a compensation whose gap is not actually exhibited on the target broker is dead weight, not defensive code — it should be removed, not kept "just in case."

What the polyfill adds on top of the real SDK (each emulated for now, native as NextGraph matures):

  • Shared-wallet identity (one wallet for everyone; the current identity id is relayed to the SDK).
  • Capability enforcement — a read filter + write guard over emulated grants attached to documents; the app declares a document's read policy and issues directed read grants.
  • Anticipated methods (inbox post, capability ops) with their future-SDK shapes, emulated for now.

Generic: no application domain. The consumer application injects its shapes and performs the acts of granting access. The relationship concept ("who is connected to whom") is the consumer application's own — the client exposes only directed per-document read grants.