9d3e2d2bfe
Fifteen findings, all verified before acting. The ones that mattered: - Corrections added without updating what they corrected. §5's table still said a cap-less NURI is one "without :k:", two hundred lines after §4 established the discriminant is `r:`. Same shape of defect in the P1a report, which kept the sentence "it is the owner's keyring, upstream the keyring is the wallet" — the exact sentence §4quater declares wrong, and the one that produced a global in-memory keyring. - A wrong source citation: RootCapRefresh/BranchCapRefresh live in verifier/src/commits/mod.rs, not repo/src/commit.rs, and are no-op stubs. - Documentation describing deleted code: isolation.ts, discovery.readIndex, the global index, and an acceptance test that was dropped with discovery. - The P1a implementation report had aged into being wrong in four places (caps not persisted, inbox processing not started, plain string types, the :k: segment). It is dated, so it now carries a header saying what later lots overtook, rather than being rewritten. - vision.md stated "a document's data is stored encrypted" in the present tense. That is the target; here the cap value is the constant OK and nothing is encrypted. Said plainly now. - Prose left mangled by an earlier mechanical find-and-replace, in four places I had claimed were repaired. Also: reach.ts and connect.ts had no home in the permanent docs — the boundary and the connection sequence are now described in simulation.md, not only in a brief.
425 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript
425 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* Cross-user access — the scenario that proves the model end to end.
|
|
*
|
|
* Alice owns a PROTECTED document and a PUBLIC one, and the public one carries a
|
|
* REFERENCE to the protected one. Then:
|
|
*
|
|
* - **Bob** has the public document's link. He reads it, sees the reference, and
|
|
* cannot read what it points at. Naming is not reading, and publication is
|
|
* **not recursive**: a public object may point at private content without
|
|
* disclosing it.
|
|
* - **Charlie** has the public document's link AND was given the protected
|
|
* document's cap. Same reference, same path — he reads through it.
|
|
* - **Bob, dynamically**: Alice delivers the cap to Bob's inbox. Processing the
|
|
* inbox files it, which fires the held-caps signal, which re-runs the read — the
|
|
* protected document appears with nothing else happening.
|
|
*
|
|
* The difference between Bob and Charlie is ONLY each of them holds. There is
|
|
* no authorization list anywhere, and nobody was named to the registry.
|
|
*/
|
|
import { test, expect, mock, afterAll } from "bun:test";
|
|
import { createEntityDoc, documentInbox, resetRegistryCache, walletInbox } from "../src/store-registry";
|
|
import type { RegistrySession } from "../src/store-registry";
|
|
import {
|
|
configure,
|
|
configureStoreRegistry,
|
|
resetStoreRegistry,
|
|
resetConfig,
|
|
capFor,
|
|
getCaps,
|
|
resetCaps,
|
|
setCurrentUser,
|
|
shareCap,
|
|
connectedUser,
|
|
} from "../src/polyfill";
|
|
import { post, read as readInbox } from "../src/inbox";
|
|
import { readUnion } from "../src/read-model";
|
|
import { sparqlUpdate } from "../src/docs";
|
|
import type { Nuri } from "../src/types";
|
|
|
|
afterAll(() => {
|
|
resetConfig();
|
|
resetStoreRegistry();
|
|
resetCaps();
|
|
setCurrentUser(null);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const SESSION: RegistrySession = { sessionId: "sid-x", privateStoreId: "PRIV-X" };
|
|
const SHIM = "urn:ng-eventually:shim";
|
|
const INBOX = "urn:ng-eventually:inbox";
|
|
/** The predicate Alice uses to point from her public doc at her protected one. */
|
|
const REFERS_TO = "urn:e2e:refersTo";
|
|
const SECRET = "urn:e2e:secret";
|
|
|
|
interface Quad { g: string; s: string; p: string; o: string }
|
|
|
|
function unescapeLiteral(s: string): string {
|
|
let out = "";
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
|
|
if (s[i] === "\\" && i + 1 < s.length) {
|
|
const next = s[++i];
|
|
out += next === "n" ? "\n" : next === "r" ? "\r" : next === "t" ? "\t" : next!;
|
|
} else out += s[i];
|
|
}
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A stateful fake `ng`: the shim SPARQL, the inbox SPARQL, and the anchored
|
|
* per-doc `?s ?p ?o` read the read-model uses. */
|
|
function makeFakeNg() {
|
|
const quads: Quad[] = [];
|
|
let docCounter = 0;
|
|
|
|
const doc_create = mock(async () => `did:ng:o:doc${++docCounter}`);
|
|
|
|
const sparql_update = mock(async (...a: unknown[]) => {
|
|
const query = a[1] as string;
|
|
const anchor = a[2] as string | undefined;
|
|
if (!anchor) return undefined;
|
|
const body = query.replace(/^\s*INSERT DATA\s*\{/, "").replace(/\}\s*$/, "");
|
|
const sm = body.match(/<([^>]+)>/);
|
|
if (!sm) return undefined;
|
|
const s = sm[1]!;
|
|
const pairRe = /(?:a|<([^>]+)>)\s+(?:"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"|<([^>]+)>)/g;
|
|
let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
|
|
const after = body.slice(body.indexOf(sm[0]) + sm[0].length);
|
|
while ((m = pairRe.exec(after)) !== null) {
|
|
const p = m[1] ?? (query.includes(`${INBOX}:Deposit`) ? `${INBOX}:Deposit` : `${SHIM}:Account`);
|
|
const o = m[2] !== undefined ? unescapeLiteral(m[2]) : (m[3] ?? "");
|
|
quads.push({ g: anchor, s, p, o });
|
|
}
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const sparql_query = mock(async (...a: unknown[]) => {
|
|
const query = a[1] as string;
|
|
const anchor = a[3] as string | undefined;
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:shimDoc>`)) {
|
|
return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:shimDoc`).map((q) => ({ shimDoc: { value: q.o } })) } };
|
|
}
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:id>`)) {
|
|
const subjM = query.match(/<([^>]+)>\s+a\s+<urn:ng-eventually:shim:Account>/);
|
|
const only = subjM ? subjM[1]! : null;
|
|
const bySubject = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>();
|
|
for (const q of quads) {
|
|
if (q.g !== anchor) continue;
|
|
if (only !== null && q.s !== only) continue;
|
|
const rec = bySubject.get(q.s) ?? {};
|
|
if (q.p === `${SHIM}:id`) rec.id = q.o;
|
|
if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docPublic`) rec.docPublic = q.o;
|
|
if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docProtected`) rec.docProtected = q.o;
|
|
if (q.p === `${SHIM}:docPrivate`) rec.docPrivate = q.o;
|
|
bySubject.set(q.s, rec);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
results: {
|
|
bindings: [...bySubject.values()].filter((r) => r.id).map((r) => ({
|
|
id: { value: r.id! },
|
|
docPublic: { value: r.docPublic ?? "" },
|
|
docProtected: { value: r.docProtected ?? "" },
|
|
docPrivate: { value: r.docPrivate ?? "" },
|
|
})),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${INBOX}:payload>`)) {
|
|
const bySubject = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>();
|
|
for (const q of quads) {
|
|
if (q.g !== anchor) continue;
|
|
const rec = bySubject.get(q.s) ?? {};
|
|
if (q.p === `${INBOX}:payload`) rec.payload = q.o;
|
|
if (q.p === `${INBOX}:ts`) rec.ts = q.o;
|
|
if (q.p === `${INBOX}:from`) rec.from = q.o;
|
|
bySubject.set(q.s, rec);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
results: {
|
|
bindings: [...bySubject.values()]
|
|
.filter((r) => r.payload !== undefined && r.ts !== undefined)
|
|
.map((r) => {
|
|
const row: Record<string, { value: string }> = { payload: { value: r.payload! }, ts: { value: r.ts! } };
|
|
if (r.from !== undefined) row.from = { value: r.from };
|
|
return row;
|
|
}),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
// User-branch `link` SELECT (the emulated AddLink records).
|
|
// User-branch `inboxCap` SELECT (the emulated AddInboxCap records).
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:inboxCap>`)) {
|
|
return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:inboxCap`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
|
|
}
|
|
// Store-branch `readCap` SELECT (the emulated AddRepo records).
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:readCap>`)) {
|
|
return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:readCap`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
|
|
}
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:link>`)) {
|
|
return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:link`).map((q) => ({ c: { value: q.o } })) } };
|
|
}
|
|
if (query.includes(`<${SHIM}:contains>`)) {
|
|
return { results: { bindings: quads.filter((q) => q.g === anchor && q.p === `${SHIM}:contains`).map((q) => ({ e: { value: q.o } })) } };
|
|
}
|
|
// Anchored per-doc read (readUnion `SELECT ?s ?p ?o`) — the document's content.
|
|
return {
|
|
results: {
|
|
bindings: quads
|
|
.filter((q) => q.g === anchor)
|
|
.map((q) => ({ s: { value: q.s }, p: { value: q.p }, o: { value: q.o } })),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return { doc_create, sparql_update, sparql_query, _quads: quads };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function inject() {
|
|
const ng = makeFakeNg();
|
|
configure({ ng: ng as any, useShape: (() => {}) as any });
|
|
configureStoreRegistry({ getSession: async () => SESSION, normalizeId: (id) => id.trim().toLowerCase() });
|
|
resetRegistryCache();
|
|
resetCaps();
|
|
setCurrentUser(null);
|
|
return ng;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Write one triple into `doc`, as the consumer's write path would. */
|
|
async function write(doc: Nuri, p: string, o: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
await sparqlUpdate(SESSION.sessionId, `INSERT DATA { <${doc}> <${p}> "${o}" }`, doc, "test");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The values `p` carries in the documents `docs`, as the current holder reads them. */
|
|
async function readValues(docs: Nuri[], p: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
|
const subjects = await readUnion(docs);
|
|
return subjects.flatMap((s) => s.props[p] ?? []);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Alice's world: a protected document holding a secret, and a public document that
|
|
* REFERS to it by bare NURI. Returns what each actor could plausibly come to hold.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function aliceSetsUpHerDocuments() {
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
|
|
await write(protDoc, SECRET, "the-protected-content");
|
|
|
|
const pubDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
|
|
// The reference is the BARE NURI of the protected document: it names it, and
|
|
// grants nothing. This is the whole point of the scenario.
|
|
await write(pubDoc, REFERS_TO, protDoc);
|
|
|
|
const pubLink = capFor(pubDoc)!; // the shareable repo link of the public doc
|
|
const protCap = capFor(protDoc)!; // the cap Alice may hand to whoever she chooses
|
|
return { protDoc, pubDoc, pubLink, protCap };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Follow the reference found in the public document — what a reader actually does. */
|
|
function referenceFoundIn(values: string[]): Nuri {
|
|
const ref = values[0];
|
|
expect(ref).toBeDefined();
|
|
return ref as Nuri;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test("Bob: reads the public document, sees the reference, and cannot read through it", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
const { protDoc, pubDoc, pubLink } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
// Bob was given the public document's link — "whoever has the URL reads it".
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
|
|
// He reads the public document and finds the reference.
|
|
const refs = await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO);
|
|
const ref = referenceFoundIn(refs);
|
|
expect(ref).toBe(protDoc); // he can NAME Alice's protected document
|
|
|
|
// …and that is all it gets him: no cap, no read. Publication is NOT recursive.
|
|
expect(capFor(ref)).toBeUndefined();
|
|
expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual([]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("Charlie: same public document, same reference — and he reads through it", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
const { protDoc, pubDoc, pubLink, protCap } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
const CHARLIE_INBOX = await walletInbox("charlie");
|
|
|
|
// Alice decides Charlie may read that ONE document, and delivers its cap to his
|
|
// inbox. She names no principal to the registry; she addresses an inbox.
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await shareCap(protCap, CHARLIE_INBOX);
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("charlie");
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
await readInbox(CHARLIE_INBOX); // processing the inbox files the cap
|
|
|
|
const ref = referenceFoundIn(await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO));
|
|
expect(ref).toBe(protDoc);
|
|
expect(capFor(ref)).toBe(protCap);
|
|
expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("the ONLY difference between Bob and Charlie is each of them holds", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
const { protDoc, pubLink, protCap } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
const CHARLIE_INBOX = await walletInbox("charlie");
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await shareCap(protCap, CHARLIE_INBOX);
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
const bobSees = await readValues([protDoc], SECRET);
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("charlie");
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
await readInbox(CHARLIE_INBOX);
|
|
const charlieSees = await readValues([protDoc], SECRET);
|
|
|
|
expect(bobSees).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(charlieSees).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The dynamic version: Bob is refused, then the cap lands in his inbox and the read
|
|
// that was empty becomes full — with nothing re-declared and nobody re-authorized.
|
|
test("dynamic: a cap delivered to Bob's inbox makes the refused document readable, and signals it", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
const { pubDoc, pubLink, protCap } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
const BOB_INBOX = await walletInbox("bob");
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
const ref = referenceFoundIn(await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO));
|
|
|
|
// Before: named, unreadable.
|
|
expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual([]);
|
|
|
|
// A reader that re-reads whenever what it holds changes — this is exactly what
|
|
// `watchShape` wires internally, played here on an ad-hoc read.
|
|
let reread = 0;
|
|
let latest: string[] = [];
|
|
const unsub = getCaps().onChange(() => {
|
|
reread += 1;
|
|
void readValues([ref], SECRET).then((v) => (latest = v));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Alice delivers the cap. Bob's client processes his inbox — the only thing that
|
|
// happens; no "receive" call exists.
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await shareCap(protCap, BOB_INBOX);
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
await readInbox(BOB_INBOX);
|
|
|
|
// Filing the cap fired the signal…
|
|
expect(reread).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
|
await Promise.resolve();
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
|
|
|
|
// …and the read that was empty now yields the content.
|
|
expect(capFor(ref)).toBe(protCap);
|
|
expect(latest).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
expect(await readValues([ref], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
unsub();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("a bare reference to the PUBLIC document is not enough either — the link is", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
const { pubDoc, pubLink } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
// Bob knows the public document's NURI but was never given its link.
|
|
expect(await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO)).toEqual([]);
|
|
|
|
getCaps().learn(pubLink);
|
|
expect((await readValues([pubDoc], REFERS_TO)).length).toBe(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// THE POINT OF THE LINK: a cap survives because it was APPLIED, not because the
|
|
// inbox is re-read. Upstream, processing an inbox message files it — `AddLink
|
|
// { read_cap }` on the User branch of the private store — and the queue is consumed.
|
|
// Re-reading a queue to recover state is using it as a database.
|
|
test("a Link is APPLIED durably: the cap survives with the inbox emptied", async () => {
|
|
const ng = inject();
|
|
const { protDoc, protCap } = await aliceSetsUpHerDocuments();
|
|
const bobInbox = await walletInbox("bob");
|
|
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await shareCap(protCap, bobInbox);
|
|
|
|
// Bob connects: the library restores + drains, with nothing asked of the app.
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
await connectedUser();
|
|
expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
|
|
// Now EMPTY the inbox — as a consumed queue would be — and drop every in-memory
|
|
// cap, then re-arm the emulation so the boundary is actually in force again.
|
|
for (let k = ng._quads.length - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
|
|
if (ng._quads[k]!.g === bobInbox) ng._quads.splice(k, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
resetCaps();
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await createEntityDoc("alice", "private"); // re-arms: a cap exists again
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual([]); // bob holds nothing yet
|
|
|
|
// Connecting restores it — from the User branch, since the inbox has nothing left.
|
|
await connectedUser();
|
|
expect(capFor(protDoc)).toBe(protCap);
|
|
expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual(["the-protected-content"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("connecting a user that does not exist provisions nothing", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
setCurrentUser("nobody");
|
|
await connectedUser();
|
|
// No account, no stores, no caps — connecting must not create a user as a side
|
|
// effect, or the emulation would arm itself in the background.
|
|
expect(getCaps().isEnforcing()).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// PER-DOCUMENT INBOXES. Upstream a repo carries `inbox: Option<PrivKey>` and its
|
|
// owner records the private half with `AddInboxCap` on the User branch — the same
|
|
// branch as `AddLink`. So "which inboxes may I read" has one answer, and connecting
|
|
// drains them all: the user's own, and one per document it opened an inbox on.
|
|
test("a document has its own inbox: anyone deposits, only the owner reads", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
const doc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
|
|
const docInbox = await documentInbox(doc);
|
|
expect(docInbox).not.toBe(await walletInbox("alice"));
|
|
|
|
// Bob deposits into the document's inbox — the cross-user act, open to all.
|
|
setCurrentUser("bob");
|
|
await post(docInbox, { payload: { joining: true }, ts: 1 });
|
|
|
|
// …and cannot read it back: depositing grants nothing.
|
|
await expect(readInbox(docInbox)).rejects.toThrow(/does not belong to the connected wallet/i);
|
|
|
|
// Alice reads her document's inbox, because she opened it.
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
const deposits = await readInbox(docInbox);
|
|
expect(deposits.map((d) => d.payload)).toEqual([{ joining: true }]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("connecting drains BOTH levels: the user's inbox and its documents'", async () => {
|
|
inject();
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
const protDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "protected");
|
|
const pubDoc = await createEntityDoc("alice", "public");
|
|
const docInbox = await documentInbox(pubDoc);
|
|
const aliceInbox = await walletInbox("alice");
|
|
|
|
// Two deposits, one at each level, both made by someone else.
|
|
setCurrentUser("carol");
|
|
const carolDoc = await createEntityDoc("carol", "protected");
|
|
await shareCap(capFor(carolDoc)!, aliceInbox); // a Link, to alice herself
|
|
await post(docInbox, { payload: { onTheDocument: true }, ts: 2 });
|
|
|
|
// Alice connects: one call, both queues.
|
|
setCurrentUser("alice");
|
|
await connectedUser();
|
|
|
|
expect(capFor(carolDoc)).toBeDefined(); // the Link was applied
|
|
expect(await readValues([protDoc], SECRET)).toEqual([]); // (protDoc holds no secret here)
|
|
const left = await readInbox(docInbox);
|
|
expect(left.map((d) => d.payload)).toEqual([{ onTheDocument: true }]); // consumer data stays
|
|
});
|