0eb25286c8
Deux mouvements de surface, aucun changement de comportement. **`packages/client` → `packages/sdk`, `@ng-eventually/client` → `@ng-eventually/sdk`.** « client » ne disait rien : ce paquet EST le SDK que l'application appelle, et c'est tout ce qu'elle appelle. L'ancien nom reste comme mot-clé de recherche dans `docs/source-layout-by-fate.md` et le tableau des paquets du README. **Une seule entrée.** L'entrée `./polyfill` disparaît ; ses symboles applicatifs — `configure`, `configureStoreRegistry`, `setCurrentUser`, `connectedUser` et leurs types — vivent dans un bloc `POLYFILL-ERA` de `src/index.ts`. Ce que la seconde porte portait mérite d'être nommé avant d'être retiré : *ce qu'on importe de ce chemin est exactement ce qu'on supprimera à la migration*. Une seule porte perd ce signal — rien à la ligne d'import ne distingue `configure`, qui part, de `docs`, que le vrai SDK remplace sur place. Trois choses le portent désormais : le bloc lui-même, l'inventaire d'exports de `docs/api-contract.md` (épinglé par `test/vocabulary.test.ts`, donc il ne peut pas rancir en silence), et le contrôle de vocabulaire sur les noms publiés. **Six symboles quittent la surface au passage**, et la fusion est ce qui a rendu le choix visible plutôt qu'hérité : - `getConfig` / `getStoreRegistryDeps` — câblage interne, atteint par `shared-wallet/bootstrap` ; - `resetConfig` / `resetStoreRegistry` / `resetCaps` — remises à zéro de test, atteintes par leur chemin interne, ce qui est leur raison d'être ; - le `share` direct — `inbox.share` a toujours été la même fonction, et la publier deux fois brouillait la frontière qu'elle servait à marquer. Corrections d'affirmations fausses trouvées en chemin : le contrat annonçait `isNuri` / `hasReadCap` sur la porte SDK alors qu'ils ne sont plus exportés depuis le passage au permissif en entrée (`NuriLike` validé à la porte) ; le README du paquet documentait `capFor`, `shareCap`, `getCaps` et `publishRepoLink`, dont aucun n'existe ; et le README de l'app d'exemple affirmait que la suite e2e la pilote, ce qui reste à faire. 179 tests unitaires, typecheck bibliothèque / exemple / harnais, e2e 42/42 contre le broker en ligne — mesuré une fois après le renommage, une fois après la fusion.
58 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
58 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
# Write loss on socket death (`SerializationError`)
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**Post-mortem — 2026-07-14 · Status: OPEN (not addressed).**
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An entity written just before a period of inactivity can be **silently lost**: it is absent on reconnection. *(Whether the write never durably reached the broker, or reached it and is not read back on a cold reconnection, is **not settled** — see Epistemic caveat below. The wording here deliberately states only the observed symptom.)* The **account / identity survives** (no fork). Observed in real conditions (Festipod, Firefox) during a pause after login/creation.
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## Symptom
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1. The user logs in, the app creates an entity (a Festipod event).
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2. A period of inactivity follows (idle, tab in the background…).
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3. The broker socket dies spontaneously with `SOCKET IS CLOSED Some(Left(SerializationError))`.
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4. On reconnection, the created entity has disappeared; the app reads back its own scope **empty**.
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## Evidence (VERIFIED — live Firefox logs, verbatim)
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```
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… REPLAY TOPIC NOT FOUND <topic> IN OVERLAY <overlay>
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… NEED REPLAY true
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… SENDING EVENTS FROM OUTBOX RETURNED: Err(TopicNotFound)
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[user1][polyfill] resolveAccount(user1) → 1 record ← the account SURVIVES (no fork)
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[user1][polyfill] readScopeIndex(…) → 0 entities ← but the scope is EMPTY
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… set reçu: 0 objets Event (public)
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… SOCKET IS CLOSED Some(Left(SerializationError)) [51, 3, 223, …]
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```
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Interpretation (**plausible mechanism, not settled**): the write was pushed into the local **outbox**, but the socket died before it was **durably flushed** into the broker topic; on reconnection, the outbox replay fails (`Err(TopicNotFound)`) because the topic was **never created on the broker side** → the event is abandoned. The account, for its part, had already been durably resolved (`resolveAccount → 1 record`): it is neither lost nor forked.
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> **Epistemic caveat.** The evidence establishes the *symptom* (loss + `Err(TopicNotFound)` + the scope read returning 0 — logged above as `readScopeIndex`, since renamed `readUserStore`). The exact *mechanism* is not settled between **(i) loss at write time** (the write never durably reaches the broker) and **(ii) cold-rehydration failure** (the write *is* on the broker but a fresh session does not reopen its own scope). The `Err(TopicNotFound)` on the outbox replay leans toward **(i) in this Firefox case**. See the @data repro below, which exhibits a neighboring symptom but **does not settle** (i) vs (ii).
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## Causal chain (TRACED — reading of the NextGraph core, to be re-verified)
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- The `SerializationError` closes the socket. The core emits the disconnection in **two** places, and they are not the same file: `engine/net/src/broker.rs:1074` sends `LocalBrokerMessage::Disconnected`, which the SDK turns into `disconnections_sender.send(...)` at `sdk/rust/src/local_broker.rs:648`. Navigate by symbol — the line numbers are volatile, and the earlier note in this file put the `send` in `broker.rs`, which it never was.
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- This disconnection is **pushed** to subscribers via `disconnections_subscribe(cb)` (PUSH stream).
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- **NextGraph reconnection is an unimplemented `// TODO`** (≈ `broker.rs:1051-1076`): nothing re-establishes the socket nor re-flushes the outbox.
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- `user_connect` returns a **snapshot** `{ server_id, server_ip, error, since }` at call time — not a stream, unusable for detecting a later drop.
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- **No write-durability confirmation API**: a caller cannot `await` the guarantee that a write has reached the broker.
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## What the SDK exposes but does not consume
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`disconnections_subscribe` **does fire** on this failure — but neither the polyfill (`@ng-eventually/sdk`) nor the consumer app subscribes to it. The signal exists, nobody listens to it; on the app side, no mechanism retries or warns the user.
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## Scope & not reproduced
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- **Observed on Firefox only** to date. A manual test on another browser did not trigger the `SerializationError` nor its consequences.
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- **@data reproduction (Chromium, real broker) — 2026-07-14, decisive.** The existing @data reconnection test (`reconnexion-meme-identite`) was a **false green**: it read A's repos back from the persistent profile's **local IndexedDB**, never from the broker. A **genuinely cold** reader (non-persistent `freshBrowser` context, the **same** wallet/account A, no local state — seeded from the wallet captured before the event) reads **0** events from A (`BARRIER timed-out (8000ms)`, `CONNECTION ESTABLISHED`). A **different** signature from the Firefox case (no socket death; the `OUTBOX empty` is the reader's, trivially empty) and it **does not settle** (i) vs (ii) — an empty barrier is compatible with both. Established on the other hand: **@data has never verified the broker durability of A's own reads**, and cold rehydration from the broker fails. Repro: `src/modules/event/features/reconnexion-froide-sans-local.feature` (Festipod).
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- **To settle (i) vs (ii)**: independently verify that A's write reaches the broker — e.g. a *warm* reader / a second identity reads the event's public doc (the two-identity isolation scenario). If it sees it → the write is durable → the cold reader's 0 is a **(ii)** (rehydration). Otherwise → **(i)**.
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## Fix leads (not arbitrated)
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1. **Core** — fix the `SerializationError` **and** implement the reconnection TODO (re-establish the socket + re-flush the outbox).
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2. **SDK / polyfill** — consume `disconnections_subscribe` → reconnection + outbox re-flush as a mitigation, independently of the core.
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3. **Durability API** — expose a confirmation that a write has reached the broker, so that the caller can `await` it.
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## Links
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- `docs/nextgraph-current-state.md` — current state of the core (disconnection / reconnection to be cross-referenced here).
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- Product impact + consumer-side caveat: Festipod concept `data-layer` → `caveat_write-durability-across-disconnect`.
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