ng-eventually/docs/api-contract.md

API contract — what @ng-eventually/polyfill exposes today, and what the future SDK should expose per subject

Updated 2026-08-03, after the source layout was reorganised by migration fate (docs/source-layout-by-fate.md). Paths, and three names, changed under this document: readModel became the directly-exported readUnion; accounts / AccountRecord / AccountStorage became virtualUsers / VirtualUserRecord / VirtualUserStorage (module shared-wallet/virtual-users.ts); store-registry-api.ts became surface/placement.ts. Two modules were created and are covered here: emulated-verifier/branch-registers.ts (the four durable registers, split out of the shim) and shared-wallet/bootstrap.ts (the injection store, split out of the /polyfill entry). The subject-by-subject rulings below are unaffected — what moved is where the code lives, not what it promises.

Scope: the APP-FACING contract only. Everything reachable from the published entry point, and nothing else. The library's internal modules — the shim machinery, the read paths, the boundary guards — are held to the same standard (as close as possible to what NextGraph does or plans) but have their own document, docs/internal-contract.md: a consumer never reads that one, a maintainer does. This split was made on 2026-08-03, together with the export change described in § 15.

Scope. The real exported surface of @ng-eventually/polyfill (verified against the export statements in packages/polyfill/src/index.ts — package.json maps exactly one entry point, .), and, for each subject, the target signature the future NextGraph JS SDK is expected to expose. Written 2026-08-03, verified against the nextgraph-rs clone (HEAD 213338f6, 2026-05-16) and the installed @ng-org/web@0.1.2-alpha.13 type declarations (node_modules/.bun/@ng-org+web@0.1.2-alpha.13/node_modules/@ng-org/web/dist/index.d.ts, hereafter index.d.ts).

How to read the epistemic labels. Every target-side claim carries one of:

• PASSTHROUGH (level 3 / level 2, VERIFIED) — the target function exists today; the lib forwards to it. Citation into nextgraph-rs or the installed .d.ts. Level numbers per README.md § The three references: 3 = JS ORM (sdk/js/orm), 2 = wasm binding / @ng-org/web (sdk/js/lib-wasm, sdk/js/web), 1 = Rust engine (engine/).
• LEVEL-1 SHAPE (model VERIFIED, JS surface ASSUMED) — the engine's model constrains the shape and is cited, but no JS surface exists at any level, so the signature offered here is this library's invention. The future SDK's name and parameter order for it are unknown.
• ASSUMPTION — nothing at any layer constrains this; the bet and what bounds it are stated.
• NO COUNTERPART — the subject has no image in the target at any layer, usually because it is shared-wallet machinery that disappears at migration. That is a finding about the emulation, not a gap in the target.

Per the design principle (README.md § Design principle): an absent implementation is never treated as evidence about the future — "the engine does not do X" and "the SDK will not offer X" are kept apart throughout.

---

1. Bootstrap and configuration

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill: one call

// shared-wallet/bootstrap.ts
export interface EventuallyConfig {
  ng: NgLike;                                    // the REAL @ng-org/web ng
  useShape: UseShapeLike;                        // the REAL @ng-org/orm useShape
  pointerGuard?: { attempts?: number; baseMs?: number; maxStepMs?: number };
  sharedWallet?: SharedWalletConfig;             // the gate's, § 2bis
  debugAccessLog?: boolean;
  init?: (...args: any[]) => any;
  initNg?: (...args: any[]) => any;
}
export function configure(c: EventuallyConfig): void;

The count is the contract here. The agreed target was two polyfill-era calls, or one; it had drifted to four, and each extra one was a reason the LIBRARY has rather than a need an application has. Four became one on 2026-08-07:

Was published	Where it went
configureStoreRegistry + StoreRegistryDeps	folded into configure — two bootstrap calls existed because the library has two internals, which is not a reason a caller should pay
setCurrentUser	the access gate sets the identity (§ 2bis). An application naming its own identity is the gesture that INVERTS the model; it must not have a published call to reach for
connectedUser	ensureIdentity awaits it. Upstream, opening the session IS the connection — no application awaits a second call
getConfig, getStoreRegistryDeps, resetConfig, resetStoreRegistry	internal wiring and test resets, reached by their internal path (2026-08-07, with the entry merge)

And two FIELDS of that one call, on 2026-08-12. The count was already one; what was left inside it still made an application build things the target never asks anyone to build:

Was published	Where it went
getSession (and the RegistrySession type with it, § 12)	the package's. Upstream a session is returned — init()'s callback delivers { status: "loggedin", session } (@ng-org/web dist/ngweb.js:124, VERIFIED) and session_start hands one back; nowhere does an application ASSEMBLE one out of session_id / private_store_id / …. Every consumer wrapped init() in a promise and wrote the same unwrapping thunk, with nothing to migrate it to. The lib's init wrapper captures the event on its way through (§ 2) and holds the session (shared-wallet/session.ts)
normalizeId	the package's, as normalizeIdentityId — trim, strip a leading @, lowercase. The identities it keys are the shared wallet's own virtual users, so there was never a decision here for a consumer to make; and one rule in one place is what stops the barrier, the URL and storage keying onto three different spaces

Both remain substitutable through configureStoreRegistry (shared-wallet/bootstrap.ts), which the published entry does not re-export: the unit suites have no browser and the e2e harness holds a session the broker handed it directly, and neither is an application.

So an application's whole bootstrap is configure({ ng, useShape, init, sharedWallet }) plus await ensureIdentity() — and the second of those keeps its call site after migration.

Target

NO COUNTERPART, by design. The whole subject is the polyfill bootstrap: it exists to inject the real SDK without a hard import (build-alias safety). At migration the consumer initializes the real SDK directly, with the two calls in § 2, and configure / configureStoreRegistry are deleted (docs/migration-guide.md § 7). Nothing in the target takes an "injected ng".

---

2. Lifecycle

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// lifecycle.ts:11 — settles the identity, wraps the callback, then forwards to the real
// @ng-org/web init injected at configure()
export function init(...args: any[]): any;
// lifecycle.ts:18 — forwards to the real @ng-org/orm initNg injected at configure()
export function initNg(...args: any[]): any;

Target

PASSTHROUGH, VERIFIED at both levels — with one argument touched, deliberately. init's callback in position 0 is wrapped since 2026-08-12: the wrapper reads the event, keeps the session it carries (§ 1), and calls the caller's callback with that same event, unchanged. Everything else — the remaining arguments, the return value, what the callback observes — passes straight through, so an application's call site is what it would write against the real SDK. This is the only place the capture can sit: it is the only one that knows both what the caller asked and what the SDK will answer, and the alternative was every consumer re-implementing it (which is what it replaces). The real signatures forwarded to are:

// level 2 — @ng-org/web: index.d.ts:108, source sdk/js/web/src/index.ts:51
export declare const init: (callback: Function | null, singleton: boolean, access_requests: any) => Promise<void>;

// level 3 — @ng-org/orm: sdk/js/orm/src/connector/initNg.ts:51 (exported as initNg from core.ts)
export function initNgSignals(ngImpl: NG, session: Session): void;

// level 2 — the Session initNg consumes: index.d.ts:264-272
export declare type Session = {
  session_id: string | number;
  protected_store_id: string;
  private_store_id: string;
  public_store_id: string;
  ng: typeof NGModule;
  [key: string]: unknown;
};

Divergence: none in behaviour (pure forwarding), but the wrapper erases the parameter types. A consumer typing calls against the wrapper learns nothing it must unlearn — it just gets no compile-time help the real SDK would give.

---

2bis. The access gate — ensureIdentity

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

export async function ensureIdentity(): Promise<PrincipalId>;  // shared-wallet/access-gate.ts
export interface SharedWalletConfig { fileUrl: string; password: string; importUrl?: string }

One call, before the application renders. It resolves the identity from the URL (?ng-id=), failing that from browser storage — and top-level it shows the barrier anyway, with whatever it found already in the field: download the shared wallet, here is its password, import it once, and name your space. Knowing who someone is says nothing about whether their browser still holds the wallet, and the barrier is the only place it is handed out. Past the broker round-trip, inside the iframe, a known identifier stands it down.

It takes no timeout and needs none: the session it waits for arrives through this package's init and nowhere else, so awaited before that call it throws, naming the call to make first (shared-wallet/access-gate.ts, refuseAWaitNothingCanEnd).

Target

NO COUNTERPART in substance, and a surviving CALL SITE — this section exists because those two are not the same thing.

The substance is pure scaffolding. Every step it performs exists only because one wallet hosts several identities: upstream a user opens THEIR wallet, it contains THEIR site (SensitiveWalletV0.personal_identity(), engine/wallet/src/types.rs:576-579), and session_start(wallet_name, user_id) takes an id that came FROM the wallet. There is nothing to name and nothing to choose. The step that takes an identifier is the one that inverts the model, and it is the reason the whole gate is scaffolding.

The call site is a different matter. An application still has to wait for a session before it renders, and that will still be one awaited call at the same place. So the signature was designed to survive: it takes no identifier and RETURNS one, deliberately. Naming an identity is the part that disappears, so it must not be a parameter; but knowing which identity you are is something an application legitimately has upstream — it passes user_id to session_start(wallet_name, user_id) (index.d.ts:276), having got it from the wallet it opened. Here the gate chooses it, so the gate hands it back. Without that, the example application had to read the gate's own private storage key.

What a consumer must NOT conclude:

• that it may pass an identity in (it cannot — that is the point);
• that the barrier is a product screen. It is a technical gate, rendered in plain DOM inside a shadow root so no application stylesheet reshapes it and its own leaks nowhere. It is deliberately not bound to a UI framework: a screen that is going away must not make every consumer adopt one.
• that SharedWalletConfig describes a user setting. It describes what a DEPLOYMENT hands out, and it disappears with the gate. The library reads no environment variable, ever — the application resolves these values at its own build and passes them.

Why it lives here and not in the consumer application: the first consumer had ~300 lines of it — a gate component, a screen, a wallet module, an identity context, three BDD features. That is code an application would have to delete, and worse, code that teaches its authors a model NextGraph does not have ("I name my identity").

---

3. The ng object

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// index.ts:55
export const ng: Record<string, any>;
// type re-export, index.ts:50
export type { NG } from "@ng-org/web";

ng is a Proxy (ng-proxy.ts:10) forwarding every property to the injected real ng, overriding exactly two things: login / session_start (currently a passthrough with a TODO for shared-wallet credentials) and sparql_update (the emulated write-cap guard, rejecting a write when a write policy governs the anchored document and the current user lacks the cap).

Target

PASSTHROUGH (level 2, VERIFIED). export declare const ng: NG with NG = typeof NGModule, 77 exported members (index.d.ts:136-231). The surface is identical by construction — the proxy adds no member and removes none.

The two overrides:

• session_start(wallet_name: string, user_id: any): Promise<any> (index.d.ts:276) — target signature unchanged; only the emulated credential injection disappears.
• sparql_update(session_id: any, sparql: string, nuri: any): Promise<any> (index.d.ts:297) — target signature unchanged. The native enforcement the guard stands in for is the engine's permission model (verify_perm, engine/repo/src/commit.rs:897), which today is called only from tests (its enclosing Commit::verify has no runtime caller — see docs/nextgraph-current-state.md § Author-signature verification). That absence says nothing about the target: write permissions are the engine's declared model, so the guard's behaviour (a refused write) is target-shaped even though its mechanism (a JS-side check) is emulation. Known limit, documented in README.md: the guard fires only on this proxy, and the lib's own writers call the injected ng directly, so it is best-effort until cap-enforcement.

---

4. Reactive typed reads — useShape

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// use-shape.ts:12
export function useShape(shapeType: unknown, scope: unknown): unknown;
// type re-exports, index.ts:48-49
export type { ShapeType, BaseType, Schema } from "@ng-org/shex-orm";
export type { DeepSignalSet } from "@ng-org/alien-deepsignals";

Behaviour: forwards to the injected real useShape; once any emulated cap exists (caps.isEnforcing()), the returned set is wrapped in a read-filtered view keeping only items whose document cap the current holder has.

Target

PASSTHROUGH (level 3, VERIFIED), with a signature the wrapper widens. The real hook:

// level 3 — @ng-org/orm/react: sdk/js/orm/src/frontendAdapters/react/useShape.ts:86-124
const useShape = <T extends BaseType>(
    shape: ShapeType<T>,
    scope: Scope | string | undefined
) => DeepSignalSet<T>;

// its Scope — sdk/js/orm/src/model/types.ts:25-38 (NOT this lib's Scope, see § 12)
export type Scope = {
  graphs?: string[] | string;
  subjects?: string[];
};

The read filter disappears at migration: in the target, isolation is cryptographic — a repo whose cap the wallet does not hold is never decrypted, a union read over it yields nothing, and a targeted read errors RepoNotFound (engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:155,163 via resolve_target). VERIFIED at level 1; the consumer-visible result (you only see what you hold) is the same, which is the point of the emulation.

Divergence to note: the wrapper types everything unknown, losing the generic T. A consumer wanting typed sets today must cast; at migration the real generic signature gives it back. Nothing to unlearn, only ergonomics deferred.

---

5. Reactive typed reads with load state — watchShape

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// watch-shape.ts:73
export interface ShapeQuery<T = UnionSubject> {
  data: T[];
  isPending: boolean;
  isSuccess: boolean;
  isError: boolean;
  error: unknown;
}
// watch-shape.ts:90
export interface ShapeObservable<T = UnionSubject> {
  getSnapshot(): ShapeQuery<T>;
  subscribe(onChange: () => void): () => void;
  refetch(): void;
}
// watch-shape.ts:166
export function watchShape<T = UnionSubject>(
  shapeType: unknown,
  scope: Scope,
): ShapeObservable<T>;

Target

Partly ASSUMPTION — flagged deliberately. surface/watch-shape.ts's header says it "anticipates NextGraph's planned useShape(shape, scope) upgrade, which will natively distinguish 'sync in progress' from 'synced but empty'". No provenance for that plan exists in this repo's docs or in the nextgraph-rs clone — treat the "planned upgrade" as an assumption, not a stated NextGraph direction. What IS verified at level 3 is that the distinction is expressible today, just not through the hook:

// level 3, VERIFIED — sdk/js/orm/src/connector/GraphOrmSubscription.ts:228,260,274
OrmSubscription.getOrCreate<T extends BaseType>(shape: ShapeType<T>, scope: NormalizedScope): OrmSubscription<T>;
get readyPromise(): Promise<void>;   // resolves when the subscription is synced — the native "no longer pending" signal
public close(): void;

So the constraint on the bet: the target can already answer "synced?" (readyPromise), and useShape today returns "an empty set, if still loading" (its own doc comment, useShape.ts:29-31) — indistinguishable from synced-empty. watchShape surfaces the distinction with a TanStack-useQuery-minimal vocabulary (isPending/isSuccess/isError), which is a shape of this library's choosing. If the future hook exposes load state under different names, the consumer's binding code changes; the underlying distinction it teaches (pending ≠ empty) is target-expressible and safe to learn.

---

6. One-shot listing — the read-model

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// read-model.ts:60
export interface UnionSubject {
  subject: string;   // the subject IRI as the document carries it — any IRI, not a Nuri
  graph: Nuri;       // the document reference the caller passed, unchanged
  props: Record<string, string[]>;
}
// read-model.ts:166
export async function readUnion(docs: Nuri[]): Promise<UnionSubject[]>;

Behaviour: one anchored sparql_query per doc (default-graph body, no GRAPH wrapper), parallel, per-doc failure tolerance, cap filter applied inside, machinery subjects dropped.

Grouping is per (document, subject), and subjects come back as written. A document holding several subjects yields several entries — one each, properties never merged across subjects; the same subject IRI seen in two documents stays two entries, told apart by graph. This matches level 3, where an object carries @id and @graph as two distinct read-only properties and the ORM fabricates an @id when the writer leaves it empty (sdk/js/orm/src/connector/GraphOrmSubscription.ts, ":q:") — several objects per graph is the provided case, and @id is what distinguishes them inside a @graph. Only graph is a Nuri; subject is typed string because an RDF subject may be any IRI. One document per business entity remains the recommended placement (a key is per repo, so isolating an entity needs a repo of its own), but that is a recommendation about writing — the read reports what is there rather than making the other arrangement invisible.

Target

Two verified counterparts, one per level; neither returns UnionSubject — that grouping is lib-invented:

// level 2, VERIFIED — the primitive readUnion composes: index.d.ts:295, source sdk/js/lib-wasm/src/lib.rs:352 (nodejs) / :555 (web)
declare function sparql_query(session_id: any, sparql: string, base: any, nuri: any): Promise<any>;

// level 3, VERIFIED — the one-shot typed read: sdk/js/orm/src/connector/getObjects.ts:23
export async function getObjects<T extends BaseType>(
    shapeType: ShapeType<T>,
    scope: Scope | string
); // returns a deep-cloned Set of matching objects

The anchored-read mechanics are level-1 VERIFIED: an anchor restricts the query to that repo's graph as default graph (resolve_target_for_sparql, engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:256-285), an anchorless query unions every named graph in the session store (same function, UserSite → None → set_default_graph_as_union). At migration readUnion survives as composition (the anchored per-doc read is native); a consumer that wants typed results should be on useShape/getObjects, not on UnionSubject — the property-bag shape is a polyfill artifact, kept generic precisely so the consumer maps it into its own types and can drop it later.

---

7. Raw document / SPARQL primitives — docs.*

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill (namespace docs)

// docs.ts:46
export async function docCreate(
  sessionId: string,
  crdt: string,
  cls: string,
  dest: string,
  store?: unknown,
): Promise<Nuri>;
// docs.ts:85
export async function sparqlUpdate(
  sessionId: string,
  query: string,
  anchor?: Nuri,
  label = "sparqlUpdate",
): Promise<void>;
// docs.ts:130
export async function sparqlQuery(
  sessionId: string,
  query: string,
  base?: string,
  anchor?: Nuri,
  label = "sparqlQuery",
): Promise<unknown>;
// docs.ts:113 — machinery, see § 15
// NOT published since 2026-08-07 — moved to `emulated-verifier/register-write.ts`.
// It skips the boundary by design ("the one write that legitimately crosses"), and a door
// that skips a guard must not be one an application can open: holding nothing but a public
// document's bare reference, one could rewrite the inbox address posted on it and divert
// every deposit meant for its owner. Go through `inbox.post` / `inbox.share`.

Target

PASSTHROUGH (level 2, VERIFIED) — these mirror the real methods 1:1 minus the trailing label (a lib-internal access-log tag, never forwarded):

// index.d.ts:60 — the installed web SDK's doc_create
declare function doc_create(session_id: any, crdt: string, class_name: string, destination: string, store_repo: any): Promise<any>;
// index.d.ts:297
declare function sparql_update(session_id: any, sparql: string, nuri: any): Promise<any>;
// index.d.ts:295
declare function sparql_query(session_id: any, sparql: string, base: any, nuri: any): Promise<any>;

depositInto has NO COUNTERPART as a SPARQL write: upstream a deposit is a sealed message, not an update into the recipient's graph (§ 9). It exists only because the emulated inbox is an RDF document — and it is no longer published (see the block above).

Store targeting — finer than "not JS-constructible". (The other docs were corrected on 2026-08-03 to match this entry; they used to state the blanket form.) Verified in the clone:

• The web wasm variant (sdk/js/lib-wasm/src/lib.rs:1575, #[cfg(not(wasmpack_target = "nodejs"))]) deserializes its 5th argument as Option<StoreRepo> via serde — so a value CAN be passed, but no JS helper exists to build the serde form, which keeps it out of practical reach. The published .d.ts documents this 5-arg form.
• The nodejs variant (lib.rs:1618, 6 args) takes store_type: Option<String> + store_repo: Option<String> and builds the store via StoreRepo::from_type_and_repo(store_type, repo_id_str) with store_type ∈ "public" | "protected" | "private" | "group" (sdk/rust/src/local_broker.rs:2969-2987, engine/repo/src/types.rs:819-828).

So the target's direction for scope placement is already visible in the source (level 2, VERIFIED, nodejs SDK): name the store by type + repo id strings. The migration-guide's anticipated getNativeStore(scope)-style resolver should expect to produce exactly that pair (or the serde StoreRepo once a web helper lands) — not a new concept.

---

8. Per-document subscription — subscribeDoc

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill

// subscribe.ts:47,60,79
export type DocChange = unknown;
export type DocChangeType = string | undefined;
export type Unsubscribe = () => void;
// subscribe.ts:69
export function docChangeType(resp: DocChange): DocChangeType;
// subscribe.ts:104
export function subscribeDoc(
  nuri: Nuri,
  onChange: (r: DocChange, type: DocChangeType) => void,
): Unsubscribe;
// subscribe.ts:184
export function subscribeDocs(
  nuris: Nuri[],
  onChange: (nuri: Nuri, r: DocChange, type: DocChangeType) => void,
): Unsubscribe;

Target

PASSTHROUGH (level 2, VERIFIED) with two deliberate ergonomic deltas:

// index.d.ts:66, source sdk/js/lib-wasm/src/lib.rs:1908
declare function doc_subscribe(repo_o: string, session_id: any, callback: Function): Promise<any>;

• The real call is async and resolves to an unsubscribe function; the wrapper returns the unsubscribe synchronously and honours an early cancel when the promise settles. A consumer coding against the sync return will keep working against the real SDK only through an adapter — a small, known unlearn, traded for not forcing await on every subscription site.
• The real callback receives one argument, the serialized AppResponse ({ V0: { State | Patch | TabInfo | … } }); the wrapper adds a second, pre-extracted type. docChangeType is a convenience over the verified payload shape (pinned by the e2e CONTRACT-3 probe), not an upstream API.
• subscribeDocs has NO COUNTERPART and needs none: it is client-side composition (a set of doc_subscribe with per-doc error isolation). The upstream fan-out primitive that looks like it (orm_start_graph(graph_scope, …), index.d.ts:243) aborts wholesale on one RepoNotFound (sdk/js/orm → engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:53-66) — the reason this composition exists.

---

9. Inbox — deposits, and cap delivery

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill (namespace inbox)

export interface Deposit {
  from: PrincipalId | null;
  payload: unknown;
  ts: number;
}
export interface PostOptions {
  from?: PrincipalId | null;
  payload: unknown;
  ts?: number;
}
export async function post(targetInbox: NuriLike, opts: PostOptions): Promise<void>;
export async function postToDocument(doc: NuriLike, opts: PostOptions): Promise<void>;
export async function share(doc: NuriLike, toUser: string): Promise<void>;
export async function read(targetInbox: NuriLike): Promise<Deposit[]>;
export async function readForDocument(doc: NuriLike): Promise<Deposit[]>;
export const materialize = read;
export async function readSynced(targetInbox: NuriLike): Promise<Deposit[]>;
export async function processInbox(targetInbox: NuriLike): Promise<Deposit[]>;
export function watch(
  targetInbox: NuriLike,
  onDeposits: (deposits: Deposit[]) => void,
  _opts?: { intervalMs?: number },
): () => void;

Target

LEVEL-1 SHAPE throughout — the model is VERIFIED, every JS signature here is this library's invention. There is no inbox method in @ng-org/web (none in the 77 index.d.ts exports, re-verified), and the verifier's dispatch has no InboxPost arm (arms actually handled listed at engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:53-1444, re-verified). The engine model that constrains the shape:

• An inbox is a keypair on exactly one repo: pub inbox: Option<PrivKey> (engine/repo/src/repo.rs:126); routing is inboxes: HashMap<PubKey, RepoId> on the verifier (engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:105, looked up at :1677, inserted at :1928).
• A message is sealed to the inbox pubkey and carries no target document — InboxMsgBody { to_overlay, to_inbox: PubKey, from_overlay: Option<OverlayId>, from_inbox: Option<PubKey>, … } (engine/net/src/types.rs:4265). The address identifies the recipient repo; nothing else is needed. This is why Deposit has no document field and why post takes only the inbox NURI.
• from optional upstream (from_inbox: Option<PubKey>) — the "identified if known, anonymous otherwise" behaviour PostOptions.from mirrors, including the null-means-anonymous case.
• The recipient's own verifier unseals and applies queued messages when it processes its inbox (engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1674-1690 → process_inbox); an inbox is a consumed queue, not a store you re-read.

Consequences per function:

• post / postToDocument — the sender-side act exists in the model (the broker routes InboxPost natively, engine/net/src/server_broker.rs); its JS surface does not. The future SDK's name and signature are unknown — docs/nextgraph-current-state.md:187 records that nothing is announced. postToDocument's resolution step (find the document's inbox address) rides on a deliberate divergence: this lib PUBLISHES the address on the document (Header-branch emulation), whereas upstream an address is only ever TRANSMITTED (ContactDetails carries ng:site_inbox/ng:protected_inbox, engine/verifier/src/inbox_processor.rs:778-830; the address→repo association lives in inboxes: PubKey → RepoId, a table of the verifier — one per user, verifier.rs:105). (Corrected 2026-08-10: this said the table was "session-local, rebuilt empty". It is initialized empty (verifier.rs:520,2820) and then repopulated at every load — Verifier::load → add_repo_without_saving → add_repo_, verifier.rs:534-566,2871,2887 — with the inbox private key persisted per repo, user_storage/repo.rs:61,171,207,362. The property that matters is that it is per verifier, not that it is ephemeral.) Documented in docs/briefs/2026-08-03-document-inbox-addressing.md.
• share — a gap upstream, not a disagreement, verified at both ends: ContactDetails.read_cap: Option<ReadCap> exists (engine/net/src/types.rs:4233) but building a message with it is unimplemented!() (types.rs:3786), its only caller passes with_readcap: false, and the receiving arm never reads the field (inbox_processor.rs:778-830). InboxMsgContent::Link is a unit variant carrying nothing (types.rs:4252) — do not read it as the delivery channel. The recipient-side filing the lib emulates is real: AddLink { read_cap } on the User branch (engine/repo/src/types.rs:1939-1948). The consumer's act (share one document's cap to one inbox) is target-shaped; only the transport is emulated.
• read / materialize / readSynced / processInbox / watch — stand-ins for the recipient's own verifier processing, which has no consumer-facing JS surface upstream and may never have this list-of-deposits shape. A consumer should treat "my inbox gets processed when I connect, and applied caps just appear in what I hold" as the durable contract (that is what connectedUser automates, § 13); code that leans on enumerating raw deposits as a mailbox UI is coding against emulation detail it may have to unlearn. The consumer-payload case (Deposit.payload as app data) maps to InboxMsgContent variants upstream (types.rs:4249-4260), of which only ContactDetails and SocialQuery are more than unit variants today — arbitrary app payloads through the inbox are an ASSUMPTION, constrained by the model only in that messages are sealed, per-recipient, and applied by the recipient.
• readForDocument(doc) — the owner's side of a document's inbox, named by the DOCUMENT. Same LEVEL-1 SHAPE ruling as read: it is the recipient's own processing, which has no consumer-facing JS surface upstream, and enumerating its deposits is emulation detail. It exists so an application never handles an inbox address.
• share(doc, toUser) refuses an unknown recipient since 2026-08-10. It used to provision one: a mistyped name minted that name's stores and an inbox, and the cap landed where nobody looks. Upstream a deposit is sealed to an inbox pubkey that reached you through an inbound contact, so you cannot address a name you invented.
• watch's _opts?: { intervalMs?: number } is accepted and ignored (kept for signature compatibility with a removed polling watcher) — dead surface, see § 15.

---

Known divergence, low impact today — inbox.share always deposits on the recipient's PROTECTED inbox. Upstream the choice follows the profile through which the person was reached (a_or_b = if details.profile.is_public() { "site" } else { "protected" }, engine/verifier/src/inbox_processor.rs:787). This library has no notion of "which profile I know this person by", so it picks one. It flattens a distinction the model makes; it will be wrong the day an application shares with someone met through a public profile. Recorded rather than fixed, because the fix needs a notion nothing here has established — note that the Identity enum that would name it is entirely commented out upstream (engine/repo/src/types.rs:586-595), so there is no profile model to read yet.

10. Capabilities — possession, not ACL

Today

// @ng-eventually/polyfill — model/types.ts. The published cap surface is now ONE type.
export type Nuri = `did:ng:${string}`;
export type NuriLike = Nuri | string;

// NOT published, each deliberately:
//   ReadCap              — `did:ng:${string}:r:${string}`. Unpublished 2026-08-10, when
//     `export * from "./model/types"` became a named list. It remains the library's
//     internal type for a cap-bearing reference, but NO published signature takes or
//     returns one: within `surface/inbox.ts` only two private helpers use it
//     (`capsSeenIn`, `capOfPayload`), plus the emulated registers. Publishing it named
//     the one value the model says must never be handed over on request (§ 0 of
//     `readcap-and-nuri-model.md`) — while leaving no published call able to produce
//     one, since `linkTo` was removed and `mintCap` is unreachable (§ 11). A type whose
//     only possible use by a consumer is a cast is worse than no type. See § 14.
//   InboxScope           — unpublished the same day, same rule: its only user is
//     `account-registry.userInbox(id, scope)`, which is not published (§ 12).
//   isNuri / hasReadCap  — the type guards (`model/nuri.ts`). Unpublished since the
//     permissive-in change: every entry takes `NuriLike` and validates at the door, so
//     a consumer holding a plain string narrows nothing. Publishing a guard would
//     invite the cast it exists to prevent.
//   hasCap(doc)          — removed 2026-08-06. It read like "may I read this?", and a
//     document in a public store answers `false` until something asks for its cap.
//   getCaps / CapRegistry / resetCaps — the emulation's engine room and its test reset.

// INTERNAL — `emulated-verifier/caps.ts` (class CapRegistry). Never published; listed for the maintainer.
constructor(holder?: () => PrincipalId | null);
mint(nuri: Nuri): ReadCap;
learn(cap: ReadCap): void;
capFor(nuri: Nuri): ReadCap | undefined;
learnFromPublicStore(cap: ReadCap): void;   // a cap the public store SERVED — read only
isReadOnlyPublicCap(nuri: Nuri): boolean;
markInPublicStore(nuri: Nuri): void;
isInPublicStore(nuri: Nuri): boolean;
open(nuri: Nuri, scope: Scope): ReadCap;
isEnforcing(): boolean;
onChange(listener: () => void): () => void;
grantWrite(doc: Nuri, principal: PrincipalId): void;    // decorative until cap-enforcement
governsWrite(doc: Nuri): boolean;                        // decorative until cap-enforcement
canWrite(doc: Nuri, principal: PrincipalId | null): boolean; // decorative until cap-enforcement
hasWritePolicy(): boolean;                               // decorative until cap-enforcement
clear(): void;

Target

LEVEL-1 SHAPE. There is no capability API at level 2 or 3 (no cap method in index.d.ts, none in the ORM), and there is nothing to introspect upstream: reading is key possession. The model, VERIFIED:

• A ReadCap is the serialized ObjectRef — format!("r:{}", base64_url::encode(&ser)) (BlockRef::readcap_nuri, engine/repo/src/types.rs:518-521). The r: segment and its encoding are upstream's, reported by NextGraph's developer and verified in that function: id and key are serialized together into ONE opaque segment, unlike the :k: object/file/commit forms where they are two. The lib's ReadCap template-literal type uses that segment, with the stand-in constant OK in place of the key material.
• "cap-enforcement swaps the value, not the shape" is a BET, and this section stated it as a fact until 2026-08-10. What the source establishes is narrower, in three readings: (a) readcap_nuri() is produced as a field value, never concatenated onto a NURI — every call site fills AppTabBranchInfo.readcap: Option<String> (engine/net/src/app_protocol.rs:1334; engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:278,320; rocksdb_user_storage.rs:162,172); (b) no upstream parser accepts a repo NURI carrying :r: — NuriV0::new_from (app_protocol.rs:643-737) tries did:ng:i, RE_REPO_O, RE_FILE_READ_CAP, RE_REPO and RE_BRANCH, and none of the regexes at engine/net/src/types.rs:48-80 has an r: form; (c) the slot the type declares for a repo read cap is a field — NuriV0.access: Vec<NgAccessV0> with NgAccessV0::ReadCap(ReadCap) (app_protocol.rs:54-62,192) — itself constructed nowhere today (only NgAccessV0::Key, :622). Per the design principle none of that says the target will not parse a cap-bearing repo NURI; it says nothing parses one yet, so "the shape survives, only the value changes" is an assumption and not a passthrough. If the cap turns out to belong in a field, cap-enforcement moves it there instead of swapping a substring — a change the surface absorbs, because the value is opaque and nothing published parses it (§ 11).
• Caps live in two durable registers by origin: created documents → AddRepo { read_cap } on the store's Store branch (engine/repo/src/types.rs:1890-1899, committed by doc_create via send_add_repo_to_store, engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:698); received caps → AddLink { read_cap } on the private store's User branch (types.rs:1939-1948).
• The one path that loads a repo from a cap is pub(crate) — Verifier::load_repo_from_read_cap (engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:2237) — unexposed to JS.

capFor(nuri) asks the only question the model admits — "do I hold this document's key?" — and returning undefined is the whole possible answer. There is no "may principal P read D?" anywhere, and the future SDK cannot offer one without inventing an ACL the engine does not have. That absence is a finding about the target's model, not a missing feature: a consumer should never expect a cap-introspection API.

The CapRegistry class itself is machinery (the in-memory record of what the connected holder holds — upstream's local user storage). It is not published at all: the consumer surface is the ACTS (creating a document, inbox.share, processing one's inbox — and, for a document in a public store, simply reading it), never a lookup; see § 15.

---

11. NURI and SPARQL string utilities

Today — nothing. The entry publishes no string utility and no type guard.

// NOT published — internal, and each for a stated reason:
//   surface/sparql.ts           escapeLiteral, escapeIri, assertNuri
//   model/nuri.ts               isNuri, hasReadCap, targetOf, parseNuri, toNuri
//   emulated-verifier/caps.ts   mintCap  (it lived in `model/nuri.ts` until the source
//                               layout was reorganised by migration fate; this list
//                               still said so until 2026-08-10)

Two decisions meet here, and both point the same way.

No guard, because the doors validate. Every public entry takes NuriLike (Nuri | string) and runs toNuri itself — permissive in, precise out. A consumer holding a string from storage, a URL or a form passes it straight in; publishing a guard would invite the cast the types exist to prevent, and would put validation in the caller's hands where the door already does it.

No mintCap, ever. Nothing on the surface may turn a bare reference into a cap — that is the model's central invariant (§ 0 of readcap-and-nuri-model.md), so the function that could is unreachable from outside.

The escaping helpers were published until the surface was narrowed. Their removal costs a consumer nothing it will miss: they are generic injection-safety utilities, and neither @ng-org/web nor the ORM exposes an equivalent (re-verified against index.d.ts and sdk/js/orm/src — the engine escapes ad hoc where it builds SPARQL, e.g. update_header, engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:196-208). An application that interpolates SPARQL writes its own two-line escaper, against this lib or the real SDK alike.

Target

NO COUNTERPART at any level, and none expected — which is precisely why none of it is published: a symbol with no successor, on a surface that promises one, is the thing this document exists to catch.

---

12. Scope resolution, per-entity documents, and the store registry

Today — @ng-eventually/polyfill (namespace storeRegistry) — plus Scope from types.ts

Narrowed twice. 2026-08-03 the entry stopped re-exporting the whole store-registry module and kept an app-facing slice (src/surface/placement.ts). 2026-08-05 that slice lost its two inbox-ADDRESS functions as well: an application deposits with inbox.postToDocument(doc, …) and shares with inbox.share(doc, toUser) — always naming a document or a person, never an address, because upstream an address is resolved from a profile and never handled by a caller. Five functions remain published, listed first below; everything after them is kept for the record and is covered by docs/internal-contract.md.

// types.ts:38 — NB: NOT the ORM's Scope (a graphs/subjects filter); this is the store scope
export type Scope = "public" | "protected" | "private";

// store-registry.ts:90,234
// VirtualUserRecord is INTERNAL (shape kept here for the ruling below).
interface VirtualUserRecord {
  id: string;
  docPublic: Nuri;
  docProtected: Nuri;
  docPrivate: Nuri;
}
// RegistrySession is INTERNAL since 2026-08-12 (shape kept here for the ruling below).
interface RegistrySession {
  sessionId: string;
  privateStoreId: string;
  protectedStoreId?: string;
  publicStoreId?: string;
}

// PUBLISHED — the whole `storeRegistry` namespace, and nothing else.
// NO identity parameter, since 2026-08-10: a session belongs to one user, and the
// target's own `doc_create(session_id, …)` carries no user at all. Passing one's own
// identity to every placement call was a gesture with no successor — and it forced an
// application to KNOW its identity, which it could only do by reading the access gate's
// private storage key. `ensureIdentity()` returns it now; these take it from the session.
export async function createEntityDoc(scope: Scope): Promise<Nuri>;
export async function listMyEntityDocs(scope: Scope): Promise<Nuri[]>;
export async function resolveScopeGraph(scope: Scope): Promise<Nuri>;
export async function resolveWriteGraph(scope: Scope): Promise<Nuri>;
export async function openDocumentInbox(doc: NuriLike): Promise<Nuri>;

// NOT published — internal, kept here because the target rulings below still cover them.
//   userStoreDoc, userInbox, documentInboxAddress, isOwnInbox, myInboxes,
//   addLink, readLinks, resolveAccount, ensureAccount, reservedAccount,
//   resetRegistryCache, and the VirtualUserRecord type.
// `RegistrySession` joined them on 2026-08-12: it was published for ONE reason — a consumer
// typed the session thunk it injected with it — and that thunk is gone (§ 1). Upstream a
// session is RETURNED, never assembled, so no application has a session shape to declare.

Target — split by what each piece maps to

• createEntityDoc(id, scope) → level 2, VERIFIED direction. Target: doc_create(session_id, crdt, class_name, destination, store_repo) aimed at the identity's real per-scope store (see § 7 for the store-targeting nuance — the nodejs SDK already takes store_type/store_repo strings). The two writes the lib performs by hand are native side effects of doc_create upstream: the ldp:contains listing on the store's Main branch and the AddRepo { read_cap } on its Store branch (engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:697-710). The id parameter is already gone from the published call (2026-08-10); expect createEntityDoc(scope) to become doc_create(sid, …, storeOf(scope)) with no listing/cap bookkeeping.
• listMyEntityDocs(id, scope) → level 1/2, VERIFIED mechanism. Upstream the listing is the store's ldp:contains graph (written at request_processor.rs:706-708), readable with an anchored sparql_query on the store; the caps come back by replaying the Store branch (AddRepo::verify → load_repo_from_read_cap). The function's shape (give me my per-scope doc NURIs) survives; its implementation becomes one native read.
• userStoreDoc(id, scope) / resolveScopeGraph(scope) / resolveWriteGraph(id, scope) → level 2, VERIFIED. The target answers these from the session: did:ng: + session.private_store_id | protected_store_id | public_store_id (Session, index.d.ts:264-272). The store IS the container; the per-scope index document disappears.
• userInbox(id) → level 1, VERIFIED counterpart with a different granularity. Upstream a user's inboxes are their public and protected STORE repos' inboxes — the only two AddInboxCap commits in the engine (engine/verifier/src/site.rs:128,149). An identity-level "my inbox" therefore maps to a store inbox; the resolution moves into the lib/SDK and the consumer's act (deposit to an address, process my own) is unchanged.
• openDocumentInbox(doc) / documentInboxAddress(doc) → level 1, VERIFIED support, no exerciser. Every Repo carries inbox: Option<PrivKey> (engine/repo/src/repo.rs:126); AddInboxCapV0 is keyed by repo_id with no is-store restriction (engine/repo/src/types.rs:1973; applied at engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1920-1928); but no code path creates one for a plain document (doc_create → new_repo_default → Store::create_repo_default → create_repo_with_keys, which builds the Repo with inbox: None — engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:3004, engine/repo/src/store.rs:264,284,691) and no level-2/3 API exposes any of it. So: the capability is engine-verified; the functions are invented surface; and the address publication is a real, deliberate divergence (upstream transmits addresses, never publishes them — § 9), with the ownership guard compensating our design, not mirroring an upstream rule.
• addLink(cap) / readLinks() → level 1, VERIFIED model, no JS surface. The emulated AddLink { read_cap } register (engine/repo/src/types.rs:1939-1948 — "so that a user can share with all its device a new Link they received", external repos only). Upstream this filing happens inside the verifier when it processes the inbox; the future SDK most likely never exposes these as calls, so consumers should not code against them (§ 15).
• resolveAccount / ensureAccount / VirtualUserRecord / RegistrySession / reservedAccount / resetRegistryCache → NO COUNTERPART. The shared-wallet shim (accounts directory, pointer → doc-shim indirection) has no image in the target — the target has no central directory of identities (docs/migration-guide.md § 3). The whole group disappears with the shim.
• isOwnInbox / myInboxes → NO COUNTERPART as API. Upstream the question "which inboxes may I read" is answered inside the verifier by the User branch's AddInboxCap records; nothing suggests a JS API for it. These exist for the emulated read guard and the connection drain.

---

13. Identity and connection

Today

// PUBLISHED: nothing. Identity is established by `ensureIdentity()` (§ 2bis) and the
// connection is awaited inside it.
//
// NOT published, and each removal is a gesture an application no longer performs:
//   setCurrentUser   (2026-08-07)  naming one's own identity — the step that inverts the
//                                  model. The gate does it; the e2e harness, which plays
//                                  several identities on one page, reaches it internally.
//   connectedUser    (2026-08-07)  awaited inside `ensureIdentity`; upstream, opening the
//                                  session IS the connection.
//   getCurrentUser   (2026-08-05)  an application knows who it signed in.
//   IdentityStore, browserIdentityStore, VirtualUserStorage, ACCOUNT_STORAGE_KEY
//                    (2026-08-05)  persisting an identity is the application's job
//                                  upstream too; the gate persists what IT needs.

Target

PASSTHROUGH-to-be at level 2, VERIFIED signatures. In the target the identity is established by opening one's own wallet and starting a per-user session — there is no "set the current user" call because the session IS the user:

// index.d.ts:276, 280, 313, 315
declare function session_start(wallet_name: string, user_id: any): Promise<any>;
declare function session_stop(user_id: string): Promise<void>;
declare function user_connect(client_info: any, user_id: string, location?: string | null): Promise<any>;
declare function user_disconnect(user_id: string): Promise<void>;

• IdentityStore / browserIdentityStore (the persisted identity id) — NO COUNTERPART; they exist only because every virtual user shares one wallet, and they are no longer published at all. Removed at migration (docs/migration-guide.md § 5).
• setCurrentUser — NO COUNTERPART; the relay of an identity the broker cannot see. Disappears with the shared wallet, and is no longer published: the gate is the only caller an application needs.
• connectedUser() (internal since 2026-08-07) — the awaitable form of what the target does automatically: the recipient's verifier processes its inbox as messages arrive/at connection (Verifier::inbox, engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:1674). VERIFIED at level 1 that no consumer call is needed upstream; the polyfill fires it from setCurrentUser for the same reason. A consumer should treat it as "await a deterministic start" (tests), not as an operation the future SDK will name.

---

14. Type re-exports

@ng-eventually/polyfill re-exports, type-only (erased at build, src/index.ts):

export type { ShapeType, BaseType, Schema } from "@ng-org/shex-orm";
export type { DeepSignalSet } from "@ng-org/alien-deepsignals";
export type { NG } from "@ng-org/web";

PASSTHROUGH (levels 2/3, VERIFIED) — ShapeType/BaseType at @ng-org/shex-orm dist/types.d.ts:5,12 (installed 0.1.2-alpha.8); NG at index.d.ts:136. At migration these imports point at the same packages directly; nothing changes for the consumer.

The library's own model types — published by NAME since 2026-08-10

The entry used to say export * from "./model/types", a blanket re-export publishing eight types in one gesture. It now names them, under one rule:

A type is published only if a PUBLISHED SIGNATURE uses it.

export type { Nuri, NuriLike, Scope, PrincipalId, NgLike, UseShapeLike } from "./model/types";

Each one's warrant: Nuri is what every reference-returning call returns and NuriLike what every entry accepts (§ 10, § 11); Scope types storeRegistry.* and watchShape (§ 12, § 5); PrincipalId is ensureIdentity's return and a field of Deposit, PostOptions and EventuallyConfig (§ 2bis, § 9, § 1); NgLike and UseShapeLike type the two injected objects in EventuallyConfig (§ 1).

Two types the blanket export published are now internal, each because nothing published names it:

• ReadCap — no published signature takes or returns one. Its users are two private helpers of surface/inbox.ts (capsSeenIn, capOfPayload) and the emulated registers. Publishing it advertised a value a consumer has no published call to obtain, and deliberately so: linkTo was removed precisely for handing one out (§ 0 of readcap-and-nuri-model.md), and mintCap is unreachable from outside (§ 11). The only use a consumer could make of it is a cast — which is what the surface's permissive-in / precise-out design exists to make unnecessary.
• InboxScope — used only by account-registry.userInbox(id, scope), unpublished since 2026-08-05 (§ 12). An application never handles an inbox address, so it never names an inbox scope.

Both remain defined in model/types.ts and are used throughout the library; only their publication changed. Nothing about the target motivates either removal — this is a statement about this surface, and the same test that pins the appendix pins it.

---

15. Machinery on the surface — what a consumer should NOT code against

Exported, but not SDK surface. Coding against these builds knowledge that migration deletes:

• docs.depositInto FIXED 2026-08-07. It was published "only because inbox.ts lives in another module", with the note that a consumer must always go through inbox.post. That note is not a mechanism: an adversarial review drove through it — bare reference to a public document, rewrite its posted inbox address, divert its owner's deposits. It now lives in emulated-verifier/register-write.ts, which nothing exports.
• getConfig / getStoreRegistryDeps — tagged @internal in source, exported for the lib's own wrappers.
• resetConfig / resetStoreRegistry / resetCaps / storeRegistry.resetRegistryCache — test/reset machinery. In particular resetCaps wipes EVERY holder's caps, which no product flow should ever do.
• getCaps() and the CapRegistry class — the registry is the emulation's engine room. The consumer surface is the acts that file caps: creating a document, inbox.share (grant), processing one's inbox, and reading a document a public store serves. CapRegistry.grantWrite / governsWrite / canWrite / hasWritePolicy are explicitly decorative until cap-enforcement — the guard they feed is bypassed by every internal writer.
• storeRegistry.reservedAccount, resolveAccount, ensureAccount, VirtualUserRecord, RegistrySession — RESOLVED 2026-08-03: no longer exported. Shim internals, now in docs/internal-contract.md. The consumer's legitimate touchpoint is configureStoreRegistry (bootstrap) plus the scope/entity resolvers.
• storeRegistry.addLink / readLinks — RESOLVED 2026-08-03: no longer exported. Consumers receive caps by processing their inbox (automated at connection); calling these directly baked in a register the verifier owns upstream.
• virtualUsers.* on the SDK entry — RESOLVED 2026-08-03: moved to /polyfill, where its disappearance at migration is visible at the import line.
• inbox.watch's _opts?: { intervalMs?: number } — accepted and ignored (no polling exists). Dead compatibility surface; do not pass it.
• The label parameters on docs.sparqlUpdate / docs.sparqlQuery — lib-internal access-log tags, never forwarded to ng. The real signatures have no such parameter.

Places the current surface teaches something to unlearn

• The SDK entry is not as pure as its header claims. FIXED 2026-08-03. The header claimed the entry "exposes ONLY what @ng-org/web / @ng-org/orm expose" while also shipping virtualUsers and the whole store-registry module. Both are gone from it, and the header now states what the entry actually promises: every symbol here has a target-SDK counterpart, verified or assumed, listed in this document. It still exports docs, readUnion, watchShape, subscribeDoc(s), the SPARQL helpers and the NURI guards — justified inventions, documented per subject above — so the promise is no longer "@ng-org surface only", which was never true, but "nothing here is machinery".
• share is importable from both entries. FIXED 2026-08-07 with the entry merge: there is one entry and one share, under inbox.
• One entry means the import line no longer says what disappears. Until 2026-08-07 a second import path (/polyfill) WAS the deletion list. It is now the POLYFILL-ERA block in src/index.ts, this appendix's note above, and the per-subject rulings in this document. That is a documentation-carried signal where it used to be a mechanical one — the appendix is pinned by a test, the grouping is not.
• inbox.read/materialize as a mailbox — enumerating raw deposits is emulation detail (§ 9); the durable contract is deposit-and-it-gets-applied. An app building UI on the deposit list should expect that surface to change shape entirely.
• watchShape's "planned useShape upgrade" — stated in the module header with no provenance in this repo or the clone (§ 5). The load-state distinction is safe; the claim that NextGraph plans this exact hook shape is an assumption and must not be cited as an announced API.
• UnionSubject property bags — polyfill read-model shape, not a target type; map them into app types at the boundary (which watchShape's design already assumes).
• The sync-returning subscribeDoc unsubscribe vs the target's promise-resolved one (§ 8) — a deliberate, documented ergonomic delta; an adapter is one line at migration, but it is a delta.

---

Appendix — full export inventory (for diffing)

Generated from the export statements, and pinned by packages/polyfill/test/vocabulary.test.ts — if this list and the code disagree, that test fails. It went stale once, still listing storeRegistry's shim internals after the entry had been narrowed, which is what a hand-maintained inventory does.

@ng-eventually/polyfill — src/index.ts (the only entry since 2026-08-07)

direct: BaseType, DeepSignalSet, DocChange, DocChangeType, EventuallyConfig, NG, NgLike, Nuri, NuriLike, PrincipalId, Schema, Scope, ShapeObservable, ShapeQuery, ShapeType, SharedWalletConfig, UnionSubject, Unsubscribe, UseShapeLike, configure, docChangeType, ensureIdentity, init, initNg, ng, readUnion, subscribeDoc, subscribeDocs, useShape, watchShape
docs: docCreate, sparqlQuery, sparqlUpdate
inbox: Deposit, PostOptions, materialize, post, postToDocument, processInbox, read, readForDocument, readSynced, share, watch
storeRegistry: createEntityDoc, listMyEntityDocs, openDocumentInbox, resolveScopeGraph, resolveWriteGraph

Of these, exactly ONE is polyfill-era with no target counterpart — configure (plus the type EventuallyConfig; RegistrySession left the surface on 2026-08-12 with the session thunk that was its only reason to be there). It is the deletion list, and src/index.ts groups it under a heading that says so. ensureIdentity is a second in substance — the shared-wallet gate — but its call site survives (§ 2bis).

Nine symbols published before 2026-08-07 are gone from the surface: configureStoreRegistry and StoreRegistryDeps (folded into configure), setCurrentUser and connectedUser (§ 1), getConfig / getStoreRegistryDeps (internal wiring), resetConfig / resetStoreRegistry / resetCaps (test resets), and the direct share re-export — inbox.share was always the same function, and publishing it twice blurred the boundary it was meant to mark.