0a2b8b1fbf
Le contrat publie et l'api-contract etaient traites avec le retrait lui-meme ; restaient les documents qui decrivaient readUnion comme la primitive de lecture du paquet, ou qui nommaient le module disparu. Ce que les lecteurs apprennent maintenant : lire un document, c'est docs.sparqlQuery ancre dessus, et lire plusieurs documents, c'est cet appel une fois par document -- avec la decision sur une lecture qui echoue ecrite au point d'appel. Deux consequences sont dites plutot que decouvertes : une lecture refusee leve au lieu de rendre une liste vide, et les sujets sous le prefixe reserve urn:ng-eventually: reviennent dans le resultat, a l'appelant de les ignorer -- sans aucun gain de droits, les deux registres qu'un document ordinaire porte etant l'adresse de sa boite et, pour un document public, la cle que son magasin sert deja a qui la demande. Les briefs dates ne sont pas touches : ils decrivent un etat de juillet, et le reecrire falsifierait ce qui avait ete decide alors.
185 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
185 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* reach — may the CONNECTED virtual user touch this document at all?
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*
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* The one predicate every path to `ng` consults, so the boundary is decided in a
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* single place instead of being re-argued at each call site.
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*
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* ── The boundary ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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* A virtual user must simulate the boundary of the future single-user wallet:
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* every access function is confined to the user currently connected
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* (`setCurrentUser`), and no cross-user access is permitted. Otherwise the
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* consumer is coded against a reach that will never exist — the same failure mode
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* as an ACL where the real model is key possession, one level down.
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*
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* Two ways a document is legitimately reachable, and no others:
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*
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* 1. **You hold its cap.** Either because you created it (the store refiles the
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* cap) or because someone delivered it to you. This is the whole of the
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* access model, so it is the whole of the predicate.
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* There is no second way, and there used to be a third door here: an explicit list of
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* NURIs "declared infrastructure", exempt from the boundary. It was removed on
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* 2026-08-07 with **zero callers**, an always-empty set, and a header describing two
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* exempted documents that were never registered — dead scaffolding whose documentation
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* claimed a hole existed where none did. The machinery reaches the shim through
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* `shared-wallet/physical.ts`, which is a different FUNCTION rather than an exemption,
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* and that is the stronger arrangement the module below already argues for.
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*
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* ── What may be exempt, and why so little ─────────────────────────────────
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* > The only reads/writes not confined to a virtual user are those that make
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* > multi-user operation possible at all. Nothing common — only the indexing
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* > mechanisms that make the virtual users work.
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*
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* The test an exemption must pass: *does removing it stop the virtual users from
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* functioning, or does it merely stop users from seeing each other's content?* Only the
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* first qualifies — and the answer is that no exemption is needed at all: the one thing
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* that qualifies (the shim) is reached through its own unguarded FUNCTIONS
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* (`shared-wallet/physical.ts`), so nothing has to be waved through here.
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*
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* Depositing into another user's inbox is NOT handled here: it is a write to a
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* document you do not hold, and it is legitimate — the only channel by which a
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* link crosses from one user to another, hence the bootstrap of the whole
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* reachability graph. It is allowed at the inbox surface, which is where the
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* asymmetry (deposit yes, read no) is expressed.
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*
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* At migration this module disappears: the boundary becomes the wallet itself.
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*/
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import { getCaps } from "../shared-wallet/bootstrap";
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import { targetOf } from "../model/nuri";
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import type { Nuri } from "../model/types";
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/**
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* Do we POSSESS the cap of `nuri`? Not "does this string carry one" — a caller may
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* legitimately be holding the bare form and possess the cap elsewhere, which is the
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* normal case: NURIs travel bare through content and indexes, while the cap sits in
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* what the user holds. Possession is what decides; the shape of the reference the
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* caller happens to have in hand decides nothing.
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*
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* `targetOf` first, so a cap-bearing reference and its bare form answer alike.
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*
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* Inert until the first cap exists (`caps.isEnforcing()`), so a consumer that never
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* touches caps keeps working. Once ANY cap has been issued the boundary applies to
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* every user, including one holding nothing: that is the isolation.
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*
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* ── Whose possession, when it is not the connected identity's ─────────────
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* `holderKey` names the ring to consult instead of the connected one. Exactly one caller
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* passes it: the emulated inbox processor (`inbox-processor.ts`), which drains an inbox on
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* behalf of its OWNER while another identity holds the session. Left out — which is every
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* other call site — the question is asked of whoever is connected, unchanged.
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*
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* It does not WIDEN the boundary: the named holder must hold the cap just the same. What it
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* fixes is which ring the question is about, so that work decided for one identity is not
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* judged against another's possession.
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*/
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// @provenance mayReach kind=aligned level=1 ref=engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:load_repo_from_read_cap — upstream possession decides by whether the key opens the repo at all; here it is a lookup, because nothing is encrypted yet
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export function mayReach(nuri: Nuri, holderKey?: string): boolean {
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const caps = getCaps();
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if (!caps.isEnforcing()) return true;
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const target = targetOf(nuri);
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const held =
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holderKey === undefined ? caps.capFor(target) : caps.capForHolder(holderKey, target);
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return held !== undefined;
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}
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/**
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* **Rule 1 — authorization**, at the PASSAGE POINTS (`docs.*`, `subscribe`).
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*
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* Nothing reaches `ng` unless the connected user possesses the document's cap. This
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* is the guard: it fires on a request that should never have been made, and its job
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* is to make sure the attempt fails rather than succeeds quietly.
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*
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* Deliberately duplicated with rule 2 below — see {@link mustNotAttempt}. Two rules,
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* two places, one criterion: a lapse in either is caught by the other.
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*
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* `holderKey` asks the question of a NAMED ring rather than the connected one — see
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* {@link mayReach}. The refusal names it too, or a processor's refusal would read as the
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* connected identity's, which is the one thing nobody would then go and check.
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*/
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// @provenance assertMayReach kind=aligned level=1 ref=engine/verifier/src/verifier.rs:load_repo_from_read_cap — the throwing form, at the passage points; upstream the equivalent failure is a repo that simply never decrypts
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export function assertMayReach(nuri: Nuri, op: string, holderKey?: string): void {
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if (mayReach(nuri, holderKey)) return;
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const who = holderKey === undefined ? "the connected user" : `holder ${JSON.stringify(holderKey)}`;
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throw new Error(
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`[ng-eventually] ${op}: refused — ${who} does not hold this document's ` +
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"cap. Naming a document does not grant access to it: a cap is looked up in what " +
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`you hold, or it was delivered to you. ${JSON.stringify(nuri)}`,
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);
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}
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/**
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* **Writing is OWNERSHIP, not possession of a read key.**
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*
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* Upstream the right to write is membership of the repo: `verify_permission`
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* (`engine/repo/src/repo.rs:584`) is reachable only through `Commit::verify_perm` →
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* `Commit::verify` (`engine/repo/src/commit.rs:780,897`), so it fires on commits and
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* never on reads. Nothing about HOW a reader came by the read key bears on it — a public
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* store hands its read cap to whoever asks (`PublicRepoLinkV0`,
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* `engine/net/src/types.rs:5098`), and a cap deposited in an inbox is a Link someone gave
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* you (`AddLinkV0`, "external repos only", `engine/repo/src/types.rs:1939-1948`). Neither
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* makes you a member.
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*
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* ── What this replaced, and why ───────────────────────────────────────────
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* Until 2026-08-07 this asked *"was this cap served to me by a public store?"* and
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* refused only then. That predicate was wrong in BOTH directions, and an adversarial
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* review found each end:
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*
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* - too lax — a cap received in an inbox passed, so an application could write into a
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* document it merely reads. Someone could ship collaborative editing on it and lose
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* it at migration. It was labelled cap-enforcement's responsibility, but
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* cap-enforcement is key MATERIAL and this is a model relation;
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* - too strict — the owner of her own public document was refused, whenever she opened
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* it from its reference before her store had been listed (a deep link, a fresh
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* session). The comment beside the code asserted the opposite.
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*
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* One predicate pushed two ways is the signal that it was the wrong predicate. Ownership
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* is the right one, it is durable (it is read from the Store branch, the emulated
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* `AddRepo`, not from session memory), and it answers both.
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*
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* ── What it does NOT cover ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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* Delegated writing. Upstream a repo's owner may add members (`AddMember` /
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* `AddPermission`); this library emulates none of that, so here only the owner writes —
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* which is a repo's state upstream until someone is added. A narrowing, in the safe
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* direction, and one an application cannot build a habit on because the target's answer
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* (be granted permission) has no surface here to build on.
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*
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* The library's own registers do not come through here at all: they go through
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* `docs.registerUpdate`, because a store document is not OWNED in this sense — it IS a
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* store, and the verifier commits to it on its own behalf.
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*/
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// @provenance assertMayWrite kind=aligned level=1 ref=engine/repo/src/commit.rs:verify_perm — upstream the right to write is membership of the repo, checked on commits only; ownership stands in for it here
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export async function assertMayWrite(nuri: Nuri, op: string): Promise<void> {
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const caps = getCaps();
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if (!caps.isEnforcing()) return;
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const target = targetOf(nuri);
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// Created here — authorship, and the cheap answer. It is also the ONLY record for a
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// document made through the raw `docs.docCreate`, which has no store to file into.
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if (caps.mintedHere(target)) return;
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// Otherwise ask the durable register: the Store branch, the emulated `AddRepo`.
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const { ownsDocument } = await import("./branch-registers");
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if (await ownsDocument(target)) return;
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throw new Error(
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`[ng-eventually] ${op}: refused — writing needs the WRITE cap, and reading a document ` +
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"never grants it. A public store serves its read cap to anyone, and a cap deposited " +
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`in your inbox is one someone gave you; neither makes you the document's owner. ${JSON.stringify(nuri)}`,
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);
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}
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/**
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* **Rule 2 — do not even attempt**, at the CALLERS (`open-repo`,
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* `subscribe`'s callers…).
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*
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* A reader that does not hold a document's cap must not issue the operation at all.
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* Not attempting and being refused are different things: the first is a caller that
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* knows what it holds, the second is one that hoped and got caught. Only the first
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* is the model — upstream you cannot even address a repo you have no cap for.
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*
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* Practically it also stops the library from asking the broker for documents it has
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* no business asking about, which is work, noise, and a leak of intent.
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*
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* `holderKey` names the ring the question is about — see {@link mayReach}.
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*/
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// @provenance mustNotAttempt kind=aligned level=1 ref=engine/verifier/src/request_processor.rs:resolve_target — upstream a repo you cannot open answers `RepoNotFound`; this is the do-not-even-attempt form of the same absence
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export function mustNotAttempt(nuri: Nuri, holderKey?: string): boolean {
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return !mayReach(nuri, holderKey);
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}
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